Public-Key Steganography with Active Attacks

Michael Backes and Christian Cachin.
in Proceedings of 2nd Theory of Cryptography Conference (TCC), Lecture Notes in Computer Science vol. 3378, Springer, pp. 210-226, February 2005. Preprint on IACR ePrint 2003/231.

Abstract

A complexity-theoretic model for public-key steganography with active attacks is introduced. The notion of \emph{steganographic security against adaptive chosen-covertext attacks (SS-CCA)} and a relaxation called \emph{steganographic security against publicly-detectable replayable adaptive chosen-covertext attacks (SS-PDR-CCA)} are formalized. These notions are closely related to \emph{CCA-security} and \emph{PDR-CCA-security} for public-key cryptosystems. In particular, it is shown that any SS-(PDR-)CCA stegosystem is a (PDR-)CCA-secure public-key cryptosystem and that an SS-PDR-CCA stegosystem for any covertext distribution with sufficiently large min-entropy can be realized from any PDR-CCA-secure public-key cryptosystem with pseudorandom ciphertexts.

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