Zero-Knowledge in the Applied Pi-calculus and Automated Verification of the Direct Anonymous Attestation Protocol

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Abstract

We devise an abstraction of zero-knowledge protocols that is accessible to a fully mechanized analysis. The abstraction is formalized within the applied pi-calculus using a novel equational theory that abstractly characterizes the cryptographic semantics of zero-knowledge proofs. We present an encoding from the equational theory into a convergent rewriting system that is suitable for the automated protocol verifier ProVerif. The encoding is sound and fully automated. We successfully used ProVerif to obtain the first mechanized analysis of (a simplified variant of) the Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA) protocol. This required us to devise novel abstractions of sophisticated cryptographic security definitions based on interactive games. The analysis reported a novel attack on DAA that was overlooked in its existing cryptographic security proof. We propose a revised variant of DAA that we successfully prove secure using ProVerif.

1 Introduction

Proofs of security protocols are known to be error-prone and, owing to the distributed-system aspects of multiple interleaved protocol runs, awkward to make for humans. In fact, vulnerabilities have accompanied the design of such protocols ever since early authentication protocols like Needham-Schroeder [13, 26], over carefully designed de-facto standards like SSL and PKCS [30, 10], up to current widely deployed products like Microsoft Passport [15] and Kerberos [12]. Hence work towards the automation of such proofs has started soon after the first protocols were developed; some important examples of automated security proofs are [25, 24, 20, 23, 27, 29, 5, 8]. Language-based techniques are now widely considered a particularly salient approach for formally analyzing security protocols, dating back to Abadi’s seminal work on secrecy by typing [11]. The ability to reason about security at the language level often allows for concisely clarifying why certain message components are included in a protocol, how their entirety suffices for establishing desired security guarantees, and for identifying ambiguities in protocol messages that could be exploited by an adversary to mount a successful attack on the protocol.

One of the central challenges in the analysis of complex and industrial-size protocols is the expressiveness of the formalism used in the formal analysis and its capability to model complex cryptographic operations. While such protocols traditionally relied only on the basic cryptographic operations such as encryption and digital signatures, modern cryptography has invented more sophisticated primitives with unique security features that go far beyond the traditional understanding of cryptography to solely offer secrecy and authenticity of a communication. Zero-knowledge proofs constitute the most prominent and arguably most amazing such primitive. A zero-knowledge proof consists of a message or a sequence of messages that combines two seemingly contradictory properties: First, it constitutes a proof of a statement $x$ (e.g., $x = \text{"the message within this ciphertext begins with 0"}$) that cannot be forged, i.e., it is impossible, or at least computationally infeasible, to produce a zero-knowledge proof of a wrong statement. On the other hand, a zero-knowledge proof does not
reveal any information besides the bare fact that $x$ constitutes a valid statement. In particular, a proof about some ciphertext would not leak the decryption key or the plaintext. Zero-knowledge proofs were introduced in [19] and were proven to exist for virtually all statements [18]. Zero-knowledge proofs have since shown to constitute very powerful building blocks for the construction of sophisticated cryptographic protocols to solve demanding protocol tasks: they allow for commonly evaluating a function on distributed inputs without revealing any inputs to the other protocol participants [17], they allow for developing encryption schemes that are secure under very strong active attacks [14], and many more.

Early general-purpose zero-knowledge proofs were mainly invented to show the mere existence of such proofs for the class of statements under consideration. These proofs were very inefficient and consequently of only limited use in practical applications. The recent advent of efficient zero-knowledge proofs for special classes of statements changed this. The unique security features that zero-knowledge proofs offer combined with the possibility to efficiently implement some of these proofs have paved these proofs the way into modern cryptographic protocols such as e-voting protocols and anonymity protocols. The best known representative of these protocols is the Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA) protocol [11]. DAA constitutes a cryptographic protocol that enables the remote authentication of a Trusted Platform Module (TPM) while preserving the user’s privacy. More precisely, if the user talks to the same verifier twice, the verifier is not able to tell if he communicates with the same user as before or with a different one. DAA achieves its anonymity properties by heavily relying on non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs. Intuitively, these allow the TPM to authenticate with the verifier without revealing the TPM’s secret identifier.

1.1 Contributions

The contribution of this paper is threefold: First, we present an abstraction of non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs within the applied pi-calculus [4] using a novel equational theory that abstractly characterizes the cryptographic semantics of these proofs. Second, we transform our abstraction into an equivalent formalization that is accessible to ProVerif [9], a well-established tool for the mechanized analysis of different security properties. Third, we apply our theory to a simplified variant of the Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA) protocol [11], the authentication scheme for Trusted Platform Modules (TPMs), yielding its first mechanized security proof. The analysis reported a novel attack on DAA that was overlooked in its existing cryptographic security proof. We propose a revised variant that we successfully prove secure.

We express cryptographic protocols in the applied pi-calculus, an extension of the pi-calculus with an arbitrary equational theory for terms, that has proven to constitute a salient foundation for the analysis of cryptographic protocols, see [3, 22, 9, 2, 16]. We devise a novel equational theory that concisely and elegantly characterizes the semantic properties of non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs, and that allows for abstractly reasoning about such proofs. The design of the theory in particular requires to carefully address the important principles that zero-knowledge proofs are based upon: the soundness and the completeness of the proof verification as well as the actual zero-knowledge property, i.e., a verifier must not be able to learn any new information from a zero-knowledge proof except for the validity of the proven statement. The only prior work on abstracting in a general way zero-knowledge proofs aims at formalizing in modal logic the informal prose used to describe the properties of these proofs [21]. In contrast to our abstraction, the abstraction in [21] has not been applied to any example protocols, and no mechanization of security proofs is considered there.

The mechanization of language-based security proofs has recently enjoyed substantial improvements that have further strengthened the position of language-based techniques as a promising approach for the analysis of complex and industrial-size cryptographic protocols. ProVerif [9] constitutes a well-established automated protocol verifier based on Horn clauses resolution that allows for the verification of observational equivalence and of different trace-based security properties such as authenticity. We present a mechanized encoding of our equational theory into a finite specification that is suitable for ProVerif. More precisely, the equational theory is compiled into a convergent rewriting system that ProVerif can efficiently cope with. We prove that
the encoding preserves observational equivalence and a large class of trace-based security properties.

Finally, we exemplify the applicability of our theory to real-world protocols by analyzing the security properties of the Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA) protocol [11]. DAA constitutes a cryptographic protocol that enables the remote authentication of a hardware module called the Trusted Platform Module (TPM), while preserving the anonymity of the user owning the module. Such TPMS are now widely included in end-user notebooks. The DAA protocol relies heavily on zero-knowledge proofs to achieve its anonymity guarantees. Analyzing DAA first requires to devise novel abstractions of sophisticated cryptographic security definitions based on interactive games between honest participants and the adversary; comprehensive anonymity properties are of this form. We formulate the intended anonymity properties in terms of observational equivalence, we formulate authenticity as a trace-based property, and we prove these properties in the presence of external active adversaries as well as corrupted participants. The analysis confirmed a known attack on anonymity [28] and discovered a new attack on authenticity. We propose a revised variant and prove it secure.

The proofs are fully automated using ProVerif. We are confident that the methodology presented in this paper is general and the principles followed in the analysis of DAA can be successfully exploited for the verification of other cryptographic protocols based on non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs.

1.2 Outline of the Paper

We start by reviewing the applied pi-calculus in Section 2. Section 3 contains the equational theory for abstractly reasoning about non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs in the applied pi-calculus. This equational theory is rewritten into an equivalent finite theory in terms of a convergent rewriting system in Section 4. Section 5 and 6 elaborate on the analysis of DAA, the description of its security properties, and the use of ProVerif for mechanizing the analysis. Section 7 concludes and outlines future work.

2 Review of the Applied Pi-calculus

The syntax of the applied pi-calculus [4] is given in Table 1. Terms are defined by means of a signature $\Sigma$, which consists of a set of function symbols, each with an arity. The set of terms $T_\Sigma$ is the free algebra built from names, variables, and function symbols in $\Sigma$ applied to arguments. We let $u$ range over names and variables. We partition each signature into public and private function symbols. The only difference is that private symbols are not available to the adversary: For more detail on their semantics, we refer to Table 7 in Section 4. Private function symbols are supported by ProVerif and are used in the finite encoding of the equational theory for zero-knowledge proofs and in the DAA model. In the following, functions symbols are public unless stated otherwise. We presuppose a sort system for the set $N$ of names: we let $s,k$ (possibly with sub- and superscripts) range over names of base type (e.g., Integer, Data, and so on), $a,b$ over channel names, and $n,m$ over names of any sort. Terms are equipped with an equational theory $E$, i.e., an equivalence relation on terms that is closed under substitution of terms and under application of term contexts (terms with a hole). We write $E \vdash M = N$ and $E \not\vdash M = N$ for an equality and an inequality, respectively, modulo $E$.

The grammar of processes (or plain processes) is defined as follows. The null process $0$ does nothing; $\nu n.P$ generates a fresh name $n$ and then behaves as $P$; if $M = N$ then $P$ else $Q$ behaves as $P$ if $E \vdash M = N$, and as $Q$ otherwise; $u(x).P$ receives a message $N$ from the channel $u$ and then behaves as $P[N/x]$; $\pi(N).P$ outputs the message $N$ on the channel $u$ and then behaves as $P$; $P \parallel Q$ executes $P$ and $Q$ in parallel; $!P$ generates an unbounded number of copies of $P$.

Extended processes are plain processes extended with active substitutions. An active substitution $\{M/x\}$ is a floating substitution that may apply to any process that it comes into contact with. To control the scope of active substitutions, we can restrict the variable $x$. Intuitively, $\nu x.(P \parallel \{M/x\})$ constrains the scope of
Table 1 Syntax of the applied pi-calculus

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Terms</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$M, N, F, Z$</td>
<td>::= $s, k, \ldots, a, b, \ldots, n, m$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>names</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$x, y, z$</td>
<td>::=-vars</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$f(M_1, \ldots, M_k)$</td>
<td>function</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

where $f \in \Sigma$ and $k$ is the arity of $f$.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Processes</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$P, Q$</td>
<td>::= 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$\nu n. P$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>res</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\text{if } M = N \text{ then } P \text{ else } Q$</td>
<td>cond</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$u(x). P$</td>
<td>input</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\pi(N). P$</td>
<td>output</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$P \parallel Q$</td>
<td>par</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$!P$</td>
<td>repl</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Extended Processes</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$A$</td>
<td>::= $P$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>plain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$A_1 \parallel A_2$</td>
<td>par</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\nu n. A$</td>
<td>name res</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\nu x. A$</td>
<td>var res</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>${M/x}$</td>
<td>subst</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

the substitution $\{M/x\}$ to process $P$. If the variable $x$ is not restricted, as it is the case in the process $(P \parallel \{M/x\})$, then the substitution is exported by the process and the environment has immediate access to $M$. As usual, the scope of names and variables is delimited by restrictions and by inputs. We write $fv(A)$ and $bn(A)$ (resp. $bv(A)$ and $bn(A)$) to denote the free (bound) variables and names in an extended process $A$, respectively. We let $\text{free}(A) := fv(A) \cup fn(A)$ and $\text{bound}(A) := bv(A) \cup bn(A)$. For sequences $\vec{M} = M_1, \ldots, M_k$ and $\vec{x} = x_1, \ldots, x_k$, we let $\{\vec{M}/\vec{x}\}$ denote $\{M_1/x_1\} \mid \cdots \mid \{M_k/x_k\}$. We always assume that substitutions are cycle-free, that extended processes contain at most one substitution for each variable, and that extended processes contain exactly one substitution for each restricted variable.

A context is a process or an extended process with a hole. An evaluation context is a context without private function symbols whose hole is not under a replication, a conditional, an input, or an output. A context $C[\_]$ closes $A$ if $C[A]$ is closed, i.e., it does not contain free variables. A frame is an extended process built up from 0 and active substitutions by parallel composition and restriction. We let $\phi$ and $\psi$ range over frames. The domain $\text{dom}(\phi)$ of a frame $\phi$ is the set of variables that $\phi$ exports, i.e., those variables $x$ for which $\phi$ contains a substitution $\{M/x\}$ not under a restriction on $x$. Every extended process $A$ can be mapped to a frame $\phi(A)$ by replacing every plain process embedded in $A$ with 0. The frame $\phi(A)$ can be viewed as an approximation of $A$ that accounts for the static knowledge $A$ exposes to its environment, but not for $A$’s dynamic behavior.

As in the pi-calculus, the semantics is defined in terms of structural equivalence ($\equiv$) and internal reduction ($\rightarrow$). Structural equivalence states which processes should be considered equivalent up to syntactic re-arrangement.

**Definition 1 (Structural Equivalence)** Structural equivalence ($\equiv$) is the smallest equivalence relation on extended processes that satisfies the rules in Table 2 and that is closed under $\alpha$-renaming, i.e., renaming of
Table 2 Structural Equivalence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rule</th>
<th>Equivalence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PAR-0</td>
<td>( A \equiv A \mid 0 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAR-A</td>
<td>( (A_2 \mid A_3) \equiv (A_1 \mid A_2) \mid A_3 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAR-C</td>
<td>( A_1 \mid A_2 \equiv A_2 \mid A_1 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REPL</td>
<td>(!P \equiv P \mid !P)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RES-0</td>
<td>( \nu_0 \cdot 0 \equiv 0 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RES-C</td>
<td>( \nu_0 \cdot \nu_0 . A \equiv \nu_0 \cdot \nu_0 . A )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RES-PAR</td>
<td>( A_1 \mid \nu_0 . A_2 \equiv \nu_0 . A_1 \mid A_2 ) if ( u \not\in \text{free}(A_1) )</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3 Internal reduction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rule</th>
<th>Equivalence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>COMM</td>
<td>( \pi(x).P \mid a(x).Q \rightarrow P \mid Q )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THEN</td>
<td>( \text{if } M = M \text{ then } P \text{ else } Q \rightarrow P )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ELSE</td>
<td>( E \not\vdash M = N \rightarrow ) if ( M = N ) then ( P \text{ else } Q \rightarrow Q )</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

bound names and variables, and under application of evaluation contexts.

Internal reduction defines the semantics for extended processes.

**Definition 2 (Internal Reduction)** Internal reduction (\( \rightarrow \)) is the smallest relation on extended processes that satisfies the rules in Table 3 and that is closed under structural equivalence and under application of evaluation contexts.

We write \( A \Downarrow a \) to denote that \( A \) can send a message on \( a \), i.e., \( A \rightarrow^* C[\pi(M).P] \) for some evaluation context \( C[\_\_] \) that does not bind \( a \). Observational equivalence constitutes an equivalence relation that captures the equivalence of processes with respect to their dynamic behavior.

**Definition 3 (Observational Equivalence)** Observational equivalence (\( \approx \)) is the largest symmetric relation \( R \) between closed extended processes with the same domain such that \( ARB \) implies:

1. if \( A \Downarrow a \), then \( B \Downarrow a \);
2. if \( A \rightarrow^* A' \), then \( B \rightarrow^* B' \) and \( A'RB' \) for some \( B' \);
3. \( C[A]RC[B] \) for all closing evaluation contexts \( C[\_] \).

### 3 An Equational Theory of Zero-Knowledge

In this section we define a signature and an equational theory for abstractly reasoning about non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs. Our equational theory is parametric in that it augments an arbitrary base equational theory.

#### 3.1 An Underlying Cryptographic Base Theory

The base equational theory we consider in this paper is given in Table 4 (Note again though that any other base theory would work as well.) First, it consists of functions for constructing and destructing pairs, encrypting and decrypting messages by symmetric and asymmetric cryptography, signing messages and verifying...
signatures, modelling public and private keys, hashing, and constructing and verifying blind signatures. In blind signature schemes, the content of a message is disguised before it is signed while still ensuring public verifiability of the signature against the unmodified message. These functions have received prior investigation within the applied pi-calculus, e.g., to analyze the JFK protocol \cite{JFK} and the electronic voting protocol FOO 92 \cite{FOO}. Second, the theory contains three binary functions eq, and and or for modelling equality test, conjunction, and disjunction, respectively; these functions allow for modelling monotone Boolean formulas. In our example theory, we do not consider additional functions for, e.g., negation or specifying explicit inequalities. We shall often write = instead of eq and use infix notation for the functions eq, and, and or.

### 3.2 The Equational Theory for Zero-Knowledge

Our equational theory for abstractly reasoning about non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs is given in Table 4, its components are explained in the following. A non-interactive zero-knowledge proof is represented as a term of the form ZK\textsubscript{i,j}(M, N, F), where \( M \) and \( N \) denote sequences \( M_1, \ldots, M_i \) and \( N_1, \ldots, N_j \) of terms, respectively, and where \( F \) constitutes a formula over those terms, see below. Hence ZK\textsubscript{i,j} is a function of arity \( i + j + 1 \). We shall often omit arities and write this statement as ZK\((M; N; F)\), letting semicolons separate the respective components. The statement will keep secret the terms \( M \), called the statement’s \textit{private component}, while the terms \( N \), called the statement’s \textit{public component}, will be revealed to the verifier and to the adversary. The formula \( F \) constitutes a constant without names and variables, which is built upon distinguished nullary functions \( \alpha_i \) and \( \beta_i \) with \( i \in \mathbb{N} \).

**Definition 4 ((i, j)-formulas)** We call a term an \( (i, j) \)-formula if the term contains neither names nor vari-
Table 5 Equational theory for zero-knowledge

\[
\Sigma_{ZK} = \Sigma_{base} \cup \{ ZK_{i,j}, Ver_{i,j}, Public_i, Formula, \alpha_i, \beta_i, true \mid i, j \in \mathbb{N} \}
\]

$ZK_{i,j}$ of arity $i + j + 1$, $Ver_{i,j}$ of arity 2, $Public_i$ and $Formula$ of arity 1, $\alpha_i, \beta_i$ and true of arity 0.

$E_{ZK}$ is the smallest equational theory satisfying the equations of $E_{base}$ and the following equations defined over all terms $\tilde{M}, \tilde{N}, F$:

\[
\begin{align*}
Public_p(ZK_{i,j}(\tilde{M}, \tilde{N}, F)) &= N_p & \text{with } p \in [1, j] \\
Formula(ZK_{i,j}(\tilde{M}, \tilde{N}, F)) &= F \\
Ver_{i,j}(F, ZK_{i,j}(\tilde{M}, \tilde{N}, F)) &= true \quad \text{iff} \\
& \quad 1) \ E_{ZK} \vdash F\{\tilde{M}/\tilde{\alpha}\}\{\tilde{N}/\tilde{\beta}\} = true \\
& \quad 2) \ F \text{ is an } (i, j)-\text{formula}
\end{align*}
\]

ables, and if for every $\alpha_k$ and $\beta_l$ occurring therein, we have $k \in [1, i]$ and $l \in [1, j]$.

The values $\alpha_i$ and $\beta_j$ in $F$ constitute placeholders for the terms $M_i$ and $N_j$, respectively. For instance, the term

\[
ZK( k ; m, \text{enc}_{sym}(m, k) ; \beta_2 = \text{enc}_{sym}(\beta_1, \alpha_1))
\]

denotes a zero-knowledge proof that the term $\text{enc}_{sym}(m, k)$ is an encryption of $m$ with $k$. More precisely, the statement reads: “There exists a key such that the ciphertext $\text{enc}_{sym}(m, k)$ is an encryption of $m$ with this key”. As mentioned before, $\text{enc}_{sym}(m, k)$ and $m$ are revealed by the proof while $k$ is kept secret. This is formalized in general terms by the following infinite set of equational rules:

\[
\begin{align*}
Public_p(ZK_{i,j}(\tilde{M}, \tilde{N}, F)) &= N_p & \text{with } p \in [1, j] \\
Formula(ZK_{i,j}(\tilde{M}, \tilde{N}, F)) &= F
\end{align*}
\]

where $Public_p$ and $Formula$ constitute functions of arity 1. Since there is no destructor associated to the statement’s private component, the terms $\tilde{M}$ are kept secret. This models the zero-knowledge property discussed in the introduction. We define a statement $ZK_{i,j}(\tilde{M}, \tilde{N}, F)$ to hold true if $F$ is an $(i, j)$-formula and the formula obtained by substituting all $\alpha_k$’s and $\beta_l$’s in $F$ with the corresponding values $M_i$ and $N_j$ is valid.

Verification of a statement $ZK_{i,j}$ with respect to a formula is modelled as a function $Ver_{i,j}$ of arity 2 that is defined by the following equational rule:

\[
\begin{align*}
Ver_{i,j}(F, ZK_{i,j}(\tilde{M}, \tilde{N}, F)) &= true \quad \text{iff} \\
& \quad 1) \ E_{ZK} \vdash F\{\tilde{M}/\tilde{\alpha}\}\{\tilde{N}/\tilde{\beta}\} = true \\
& \quad 2) \ F \text{ is an } (i, j)-\text{formula}
\end{align*}
\]

where $\{\tilde{M}/\tilde{\alpha}\}\{\tilde{N}/\tilde{\beta}\}$ denotes the substitution of each $\alpha_k$ with $M_k$ and of each $\beta_l$ with $N_l$. Intuitively, this rule guarantees in the abstract model the soundness and correctness of zero-knowledge protocols. A formal computational soundness result for a similar, but simpler abstraction of zero-knowledge proofs has recently been proven in [7].

3.3 An Illustrating Example

We illustrate the zero-knowledge abstraction by means of the following example protocol. We keep the protocol simplistic in order to focus on the usage of zero-knowledge proofs; in particular, we ignore vulnerabilities
due to replay attacks and corresponding countermeasures such as nonces and timestamps.

\[
\begin{array}{c}
A & B & S_i \\
\hline
\{A,B\}_{k_{S_i}}
\end{array}
\]

Party \(B\) receives a signed message \(\{A, B\}\) from some server \(S_i \in \{S_1, \ldots, S_n\}\). (This signed message might, e.g., serve as a certificate that allows \(B\) to prove that he has been authorized to contact \(A\).) While \(B\) should be able to convince \(A\) that he owns a signature on this message issued by one of the possible \(n\) servers, the protocol should ensure that \(A\) does not learn which server \(S_i\) in fact issued the signature. This prevents \(B\) from simply forwarding the signed message to \(A\). Instead, \(B\) proves knowledge of such a signature by a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof \(ZK\).

We now carefully examine the proof of knowledge \(ZK\). We aim at formalizing the following statement: “There exists \(\alpha\) such that \(\alpha\) is a signature of \(A\) and \(B\), and this signature was created using one of the signature keys \(k_{S_1}, \ldots, k_{S_n}\)” . Coming up with a formalization of this statement first requires us to tell the secret terms from the terms leaked to the verifier. The identifiers of \(A\) and \(B\) clearly have to be revealed since the proof intends to allow \(B\) to prove that he has been authorized to contact \(A\). The signature itself and the corresponding verification key \(pk(k_{S_i})\), however, have to be kept secret to preserve the anonymity of \(S_i\). These requirements are cast in our zero-knowledge notation as follows:

\[
ZK(\text{sign}(\text{pair}(A, B), sk(k_{S_i}))) = ZK_{2,n+1} \left( \begin{array}{c}
\text{sign}(\text{pair}(A, B), sk(k_{S_i})), pk(k_{S_i}); \\
\ldots, pk(k_{S_n}), \text{pair}(A, B); \\
\bigvee_{i=1,n} \alpha_2 = \beta_i \land \text{ver}(\alpha_1, \beta_{n+1}, \alpha_2) \end{array} \right)
\]

This statement captures that the signature \(\text{sign}(\text{pair}(A, B), sk(k_{S_i}))\) and the public key \(pk(k_{S_i})\) used in the verification are kept secret (i.e., the identity of \(S_i\) is not revealed) while the proof reveals the public keys of all servers (this includes \(pk(k_{S_i})\) but does not tell it from the remaining public keys) as well as the identifiers of \(A\) and \(B\). The formula states that the verification key of the signature belongs to the set \(\{pk(k_{S_1}), \ldots, pk(k_{S_n})\}\), and that the signed message consists of a pair composed of the identifiers of \(A\) and \(B\). We obtain the following description of a single protocol run:

\[
\begin{align*}
A & \triangleq a(y).\text{if } \text{Test then } \overline{b(\text{ok})} \text{ else } \overline{b(\text{bad}_A)} \\
B & \triangleq a(x).\text{if } (\text{ver}(x, \text{pair}(A, B), pk(k_{S_i}))) \\
& \text{ then } \overline{\pi(ZK(x))} \text{ else } \overline{b(\text{bad}_B)} \\
S_i & \triangleq \pi(\text{sign}(\text{pair}(A, B), sk(k_{S_i}))) \\
\text{Prot} & \triangleq nk_A.nk_B.nk_{S_1}.\ldots.nk_{S_n}. \\
& \pi(pk(k_{S_1})).\ldots.\pi(pk(k_{S_n})).(A | B | S_i)
\end{align*}
\]

where \(\text{Test}\) constitutes the following condition:

\[
\forall_{2,n+1} \left( \bigvee_{i=1,n} \alpha_2 = \beta_i \land \text{ver}(\alpha_1, \beta_{n+1}, \alpha_2), y \right) = \text{true} \\
\land \bigwedge_{i=1,n} \text{Public}_i(y) = pk(k_{S_i}) \land \text{Public}_{n+1}(y) = \text{pair}(A, B)
\]

We wrote \(\text{Test}\) using conjunctions only to increase readability; \(\text{Test}\) can be straightforwardly encoded in the syntax of the calculus by a sequence of conditionals.
4 Towards a Mechanized Analysis of Zero-Knowledge

The equational theory $E_{ZK}$ defined in the previous section is not suitable for existing tools for mechanized security protocol analysis. The reason is that the number of possible formulas, and thus the number of equational rules in $E_{ZK}$, is infinite. In this section, we specify an equivalent equational theory in terms of a convergent rewriting system. This theory turns out to be suitable for ProVerif [9], a well-established tool for mechanized verification of different security properties of cryptographic protocols specified in a variant of the applied pi-calculus.

4.1 A Finite Specification of Zero-Knowledge

The central idea of our equivalent finite theory is to focus on the zero-knowledge proofs used within the process specification. For terms $M$ and processes $P$, we let $\text{terms}(M)$ denote the set of subterms of $M$ and $\text{terms}(P)$ denote the set of terms in $P$. We can now formally define the notion of $(\mathcal{F}, h, l)$-validity of terms and processes.

**Definition 5 (Process Validity)** A term $Z$ is $(\mathcal{F}, h, l)$-valid if and only if the following conditions hold:

1. for every $\text{ZK}_{i,j}(\tilde{M}, \tilde{N}, F) \in \text{terms}(Z)$ and $\text{Ver}_{i,j}(F, M) \in \text{terms}(Z)$,
   
   (a) $F$ is an $(i, j)$-formula and $(i, j, F) \in \mathcal{F},$
   
   (b) $F \in T_{\Sigma_{\text{base}} \cup \{\alpha_k, \beta_l \mid k \in [1, i], l \in [1, j]\}},$
   
   (c) and for every $(i, j, F') \in \mathcal{F}$ such that $E_{ZK} \vdash F = F'$, we have $F = F'$.

2. For every $k \in \mathbb{N}$, $\alpha_k$ and $\beta_k$ occur in $Z$ only inside of the last argument of some $\text{ZK}_{i,j}$ or $\text{Ver}_{i,j}$ function.

3. for every $(i, j, F) \in \mathcal{F}$, we have $i \in [0, h]$ and $j \in [0, l]$.

4. for every $\text{Public}_p(M) \in \text{terms}(Z)$, we have $p \in [1, l]$.

A process $\mathcal{P}$ is $(\mathcal{F}, h, l)$-valid if and only if $M$ is $(\mathcal{F}, h, l)$-valid for every $M \in \text{terms}(P)$.

We check that each zero-knowledge proof generation and verification is tracked in $\mathcal{F}$ (condition 1a). For the sake of simplicity, we prevent the occurrence of zero-knowledge operators within formulas in the process specification (condition 1b). Without loss of generality, we also require that equivalent formulas occurring in zero-knowledge proofs of the same arity are syntactically equal (condition 1c) and that the $\alpha_i$’s and $\beta_j$’s only occur within formulas (condition 2). Finally, we check that the arity of private and public components of zero-knowledge proofs used in the process specification is less or equal than $h$ and $l$, respectively (conditions 3 and 4).

Given an $(\mathcal{F}, h, l)$-valid process, we can easily define a finite equational theory $E_{ZK, FZK}^{F, h, l}$ for $(\mathcal{F}, h, l)$-valid terms by a convergent rewriting system. For any $(i, j, F) \in \mathcal{F}$, we include in the signature $\Sigma_{ZK, FZK}^{F, h, l}$ the function symbols $\text{ZK}_{i,j}^F$ and $\text{Ver}_{i,j}^F$ of arity $i + j$ and 1, respectively. We then replace every term $\text{ZK}_{i,j}(\tilde{M}, \tilde{N}, F)$ and $\text{Ver}_{i,j}(F, M)$ in the process specification by $\text{ZK}_{i,j}^F(\tilde{M}, \tilde{N})$ and $\text{Ver}_{i,j}^F(M)$, respectively. Since formulas
We obtain a finite set of rules since the number of ZK constructors is finite.

**Table 6**: Finite equational theory for zero-knowledge with respect to an \((F, h, l)\)-valid process.

\[
\Sigma_{\text{FZK}} = \Sigma_{\text{base}} \cup \begin{cases}
\{ \text{ZK}^F_{i,j}, \text{PZK}^F_{i,j}, \text{Ver}^F_{i,j}, \text{FakeZK}_k, \text{Public}_p, \\
\text{Formula}, \text{FakeCollect}, \text{FakePublic}, \text{FakeVer}, \alpha_g, \beta_p \}
\end{cases}
\]

For finitely modelling the verification of zero-knowledge proofs, we include in \(\Sigma_{\text{FZK}}\) the following functions:

- \(\text{PZK}^F_{i,j}\) of arity \(i + j + 1\)
- \(\text{ZK}^F_{i,j}\) of arity \(i + j\)
- \(\text{FakeZK}_k\) of arity \(k + 2\)
- \(\text{FakeVer}\) of arity \(4\)
- \(\text{FakePublic}\) and \(\text{FakeCollect}\) of arity \(2\)
- \(\text{Ver}^F_{i,j}\), \(\text{Public}_p\), and \(\text{Formula}\) of arity \(1\)

\(\text{PZK}^F_{i,j}\) is private.

\(E^F_{\text{FZK}}\) is the smallest equational theory satisfying the equations of \(E_{\text{base}}\) and the following equations, for every \((i, j, F) \in F:\)

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{ZK}^F_{i,j}(\bar{x}, \bar{y}) & = \text{PZK}^F_{i,j}(\bar{x}, \bar{y}, F\{\bar{x}/\alpha\}\{\bar{y}/\beta\}) \\
\text{Ver}^F_{i,j}(\text{PZK}^F_{i,j}(\bar{x}, \bar{y}, \text{true})) & = \text{true} \\
\text{Public}_p(\text{PZK}^F_{i,j}(\bar{x}, \bar{y}, z)) & = y_p \quad p \in [1, j] \\
\text{Formula}(\text{PZK}^F_{i,j}(\bar{x}, \bar{y}, z)) & = F \\
\text{Public}_p(\text{FakeZK}_k(x, \bar{y}, z)) & = y_p \quad p \in [1, k], k \in [0, l] \\
\text{Formula}(\text{FakeZK}_k(x, \bar{y}, z)) & = z \quad k \in [0, l]
\end{align*}
\]

The rule for extracting the public component is defined in the expected manner. Extracting the formula from a zero-knowledge proof \(\text{PZK}^F_{i,j}(\bar{M}, \bar{N}, F\{\bar{M}/\alpha\}\{\bar{N}/\beta\})\) requires an additional thought: for preserving the secrecy of private components, the function \text{Formula} yields the formula \(F\) (without the substitution \{\(\bar{M}/\alpha\}\{\bar{N}/\beta\}\}) in order to prevent the adversary from deriving the formula instantiated with private terms.

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Public}_p(\text{PZK}^F_{i,j}(\bar{x}, \bar{y}, z)) & = y_p \quad p \in [1, j] \\
\text{Formula}(\text{PZK}^F_{i,j}(\bar{x}, \bar{y}, z)) & = F
\end{align*}
\]

We obtain a finite set of rules since the number of \(\text{ZK}^F_{i,j}\) and \(\text{Ver}^F_{i,j}\) constructors corresponds to the (finite) number of formulas occurring in the process specification. The \(\text{PZK}^F_{i,j}\) functions are private; hence they cannot be used by the adversary to derive terms of the form \(\text{PZK}^F_{i,j}(\bar{M}, \bar{N}, \text{true})\), which would be successfully verified by trusted participants regardless of the value of \(F\{\bar{M}/\alpha\}\{\bar{N}/\beta\}\). The possibility to construct such terms would break the soundness property of zero-knowledge proofs.

It now remains to encode the zero-knowledge proofs generated by the environment. These proofs possibly contain formulas or have arities different from the ones specified in the process. We include in \(\Sigma_{\text{FZK}}\) a finite set of symbols \(\text{FakeZK}_k\) of arity \(k + 2\), where \(k \in [0, l]\). The term \(\text{FakeZK}_k(M, \bar{N}, F)\) never occurs in
process specifications and represents zero-knowledge statements forged by the adversary; here $M$ constitutes a distinguished term that uniquely refers to the zero-knowledge proof and that plays a role only in the proof of soundness, $\tilde{N}$ denotes the first $k$ elements of the public component, and $F$ is the formula. The equational rules for extracting the public components and the formula from FakeZK$_k$ terms are specified as follows:

$$
\begin{align*}
\text{Public}_p(\text{FakeZK}_k(x, \tilde{y}, z)) &= y_k \\
\text{Formula}(\text{FakeZK}_k(x, \tilde{y}, z)) &= z
\end{align*}
$$

for any $p \in [1, k]$ and $k \in [0, l]$. We additionally include in $\Sigma_{FZK}$ functions FakeCollect, FakePublic, and FakeVer. These functions are only used for proving the finite theory equivalent to the infinite one in the next section; the functions are free in that they do not occur in any equations.

### 4.2 Compilation into Finite Form

We now define the static compilation of terms and processes.

**Definition 6 (Static Compilation)** The $(\mathcal{F}, h, l)$-static compilation is the partial function $\sigma : T_{\Sigma_{ZK}} \rightarrow T_{\Sigma_{FZK}}$ recursively defined as follows:

$$
\begin{align*}
\text{ZZK}_{i,j}(\tilde{M}, \tilde{N}, F)\sigma &= \text{ZZK}^F_{i,j}(\tilde{M}\sigma, \tilde{N}\sigma) & \forall (i, j, F) \in \mathcal{F} \\
\text{Ver}_{i,j}(F, M)\sigma &= \text{Ver}^F_{i,j}(M\sigma) & \forall (i, j, F) \in \mathcal{F} \\
\text{Public}_p(M)\sigma &= \text{Public}_p(M\sigma) & \forall p \in [1, l] \\
\text{Formula}(M)\sigma &= \text{Formula}(M\sigma) \\
f(M_1, \ldots, M_i)\sigma &= f(M_1\sigma, \ldots, M_i\sigma) & \forall f \in \Sigma_{\text{base}} \\
x\sigma &= x & \forall x \\
n\sigma &= n & \forall n
\end{align*}
$$

The $(\mathcal{F}, h, l)$-static compilation constitutes a total function when restricted to $(\mathcal{F}, h, l)$-valid terms. The first equations deal with the compilation of zero-knowledge proofs and operators acting on them. The static compilation acts component-wise on the remaining terms and behaves as the identity function on names and variables. The compilation of a process $P$, written $P\sigma$, is defined by the compilation of the terms occurring therein.

The following theorem finally states that observational equivalence is preserved under static compilation and hence asserts the soundness of the encoding from the infinite specification into the finite specification.

**Theorem 1 (Preservation of Observational Equivalence)** Let $P$ and $Q$ be $(\mathcal{F}, h, l)$-valid processes and $\sigma$ be the $(\mathcal{F}, h, l)$-static compilation. If $P\sigma \approx_{E_{FZK}} Q\sigma$, then $P \approx_{E_{ZK}} Q$.

We additionally prove that a comprehensive class of trace-based properties is preserved under static compilation. We first define the notion of an execution trace. This requires to review the labelled operational semantics that extends the semantics given in Table 3 by allowing us to reason about processes that interact with their environment. The labelled transition system is given in Table 7.

**Definition 7 (Execution Traces)** The set of execution traces of an extended process $A$, written $\text{traces}(A)$, is defined as follows:

$$
\text{traces}(A) = \{ \mu_1\phi(A_1), \ldots, \mu_n\phi(A_n) \mid A \rightarrow^{\mu_1} A_1 \ldots \rightarrow^{\mu_n} A_n \}
$$
We first review these notions.

Table 7
Labelled transition system

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IN</th>
<th>M ∈ T_Σ⁺</th>
<th>OUT-ATOM</th>
<th>OPEN-ATOM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a(x).P ↠ M</td>
<td>P[a(M)]</td>
<td>P[σ]</td>
<td>A ↠ A'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scope</td>
<td>A ↠ A'</td>
<td>u does not occur in μ</td>
<td>νu.A ↠ νu.A'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAR</td>
<td>A ↦ A'</td>
<td>bound(μ) ∩ free(B) = ψ</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STRUCT</td>
<td>A ≜ B</td>
<td>B ↞ B'</td>
<td>B' ≜ A'</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notation: Σ⁺ contains the public function symbols in Σ. In OUT-ATOM, u is either a channel name or a variable.

In the following, we let s range over execution traces. We now introduce the notion of trace-based security property. We assume the existence of a special channel c that is never restricted by the process. In the following, we let B(M₁,...,M_n) denote a boolean formula over the terms M₁,...,M_n: such terms are meant to express trace-based security properties. For instance, the notion of authenticity can be formalized as pair(end, x) ⇒ pair(begin, x), where end and begin are special nullary functions.

Definition 8 (Trace-based Security Property) A trace s satisfies the event M with substitution ξ, written s ⊩ ξ s if and only if there exist s₁, s₂, N, ξ such that s ⊩ s₁ : τ(N) : s₂ and E_ZK ⊩ N = Mξ.

A trace s satisfies the property B(M₁,...,M_n) with substitution ξ, written s ⊩ ξ B(M₁,...,M_n), if and only if B(s ⊩ ξ M₁,...,s ⊩ ξ M_n).

A process satisfies the property B(M₁,...,M_n), written P ⊩ ξ B(M₁,...,M_n), if and only if for every trace s ∈ traces(P), there exists ξ such that s ⊩ ξ B(M₁,...,M_n)

Finally, we can state the theorem of preservation for trace-based security properties.

Theorem 2 (Trace-based Security Property Preservation) Let P be a (F,h,l)-valid process, σ be the (F,h,l)-static compilation, and M₁,...,M_n be (F,h,l)-valid terms. If Pσ ⊩ B(M₁σ,...,M_nσ), then P ⊩ B(M₁,...,M_n).

4.3 Preservation of Observational Equivalence and Trace-based Security Properties

Instead of proving that observational equivalence is preserved under static compilation, we show preservation of an equivalent formulation of observational equivalence based on static equivalence and labelled bisimilarity. We first review these notions.

Definition 9 (Term Equality in Frames) Two terms M and N are equal in a frame φ, written (M = N)φ, if and only if φ ≡ νn.σ, Mσ = Nσ, and \{n\} ∩ (fn(M) ∪ fn(N)) = ψ for some names n and substitution σ.

Definition 10 (Static Equivalence) Two closed frames φ and ψ are statically equivalent, written φ ≈ s ψ if and only if dom(φ) = dom(ψ) and for all terms M and N, it holds that (M = N)φ if and only if (M = N)ψ.
We now characterize the notion of validity of extended processes. Intuitively, an extended process is labelled bisimilarity valid if it can be separated into an \((\mathcal{F}, h, l)\)-valid process and a frame where free variables, referring to output messages, are associated to \((\mathcal{F}, h, l)\)-valid terms, and bound variables, referring to input messages, are associated to terms in \((\mathcal{F}, h, l)\)-normal form that only contain free names and free variables.

We now define the notion of labelled bisimilarity, which constitutes an equivalent notion of observational equivalence. Labelled bisimilarity does not rely on the universal quantification over evaluation contexts used in the definition of observational equivalence.

**Definition 11 (Labelled Bisimilarity)** Labelled bisimilarity \((\simeq^l)\) is the largest symmetric relation \(R\) on closed extended processes such that \(ARB\) implies:

1. \(A \simeq^l B\);
2. if \(A \rightarrow A'\), then \(B \rightarrow^* B'\) and \(A'R B'\) for some \(B'\);
3. if \(A \mu \rightarrow A'\) and \(fv(\mu) \subseteq \text{dom}(A)\) and \(bn(\mu) \cap fn(B) = \emptyset\), then \(B \rightarrow^* B'\) and \(A'R B'\) for some \(B'\).

We finally state the well-known equivalence between observational equivalence and labelled bisimilarity.\[4\]

**Theorem 3 (Observational Equivalence and Labelled Bisimilarity)** Observational equivalence coincides with labelled bisimilarity: \(\simeq = \simeq^l\).

It hence remains to be shown that labelled bisimilarity is preserved under static compilation. In the following, we write \(P \equiv_E Q\) to emphasize that \(P\) and \(Q\) are structurally equivalent with respect to an equational theory \(E\). Furthermore, we write \(M\phi\) for the ground term obtained by repeated application of the substitution in \(\phi\) to \(M\), where we assume that \(fv(M) \subseteq fv(\phi)\). This notation is well-defined since frames do not contain substitutions with cyclic dependencies. The next definition introduces a normal form for terms. Intuitively, a term is in \((\mathcal{F}, h, l)\)-normal form if the subterms generated by the environment cannot be further simplified (conditions \[1\] and \[2\]) and, in the case of zero-knowledge proofs, they either comply with the process specification or belong to a different equivalence class (condition \[3\]).

**Definition 12 (Normal Form)** A term \(M \in T_{\Sigma_{ZK}}\) is in \((\mathcal{F}, h, l)\)-normal form with respect to a frame \(\phi\) if and only if the following conditions hold:

1. for every Public\(_{i,j}(Z) \in \text{terms}(M)\), \(i, j', \tilde{M}, \tilde{N}, F\) such that \(j > l\) and \(E_{ZK} \vdash Z\phi = ZK_{i,j'}(\tilde{M}, \tilde{N}, F)\), we have \(j' \leq j\).
2. for every \(\forall_{i,j}(F, Z) \in \text{terms}(M)\), \(\tilde{M}, \tilde{N}\) such that \(E_{ZK} \vdash Z\phi = ZK_{i,j}(\tilde{M}, \tilde{N}, F)\), we have that \((i, j, F) \in \mathcal{F}\).
3. for every \(ZK_{i,j}(\tilde{M}, \tilde{N}, F) \in \text{terms}(M)\), \(F'\) such that \((i, j, F') \in \mathcal{F}\) and \(\Sigma_{ZK} \vdash F = F'\), we have \(F = F'\).

For any term there exists an equivalent term in normal form.

**Proposition 1 (Normal Form)** For any term \(M \in T_{\Sigma_{ZK}}\) and frame \(\phi\), there exists a term \(N \in T_{\Sigma_{ZK}}\) in \((\mathcal{F}, h, l)\)-normal form with respect to \(\phi\) such that \(E_{ZK} \vdash (M = N)\phi\).

**Proof.** By an inspection of the equational rules in Table \[5\] and Definition \[12\].
Definition 13 (Extended Process Validity) A frame $\phi$ is $(\mathcal{F}, h, l)$-valid if and only if there exist $\vec{n}, \vec{y}, \{\vec{Z}/\vec{x}\}$, with $\vec{y} \subseteq \vec{x}$, such that the following conditions hold:

1. $\phi \equiv \forall \vec{n}.\forall \vec{y}.\{\vec{Z}/\vec{x}\}$.
2. for every $x_k \in fv(\phi)$, we have that $Z_k$ is $(\mathcal{F}, h, l)$-valid.
3. for every $z_k \in bv(\phi)$, we have that $Z_k$ in $(\mathcal{F}, h, l)$-normal form with respect to $\phi$ and $\text{free}(Z_k) \cap \text{bound}(\phi) = \emptyset$.

An extended process $A$ is $(\mathcal{F}, h, l)$-valid if and only if there exist $\vec{n}, \vec{y}, \{\vec{M}/\vec{x}\}$, with $\vec{y} \subseteq \vec{x}$, such that the following conditions hold:

1. $A = \forall \vec{n}.\forall \vec{y}.\{\vec{Z}/\vec{x}\}|P$.
2. $\forall \vec{n}.\forall \vec{y}.\{\vec{Z}/\vec{x}\}$ is $(\mathcal{F}, h, l)$-valid.
3. $P$ is $(\mathcal{F}, h, l)$-valid.

In the following, we use $\text{FakeCollect}(\vec{M})$ for $\vec{M} = M_1, \ldots, M_n$ as an abbreviation for the term $\text{FakeCollect}(M_1, \text{FakeCollect}(M_2, \ldots, \text{FakeCollect}(M_{n-1}, M_n))$. We further consider a countable set of names that are meant to represent natural numbers, denoted $i, j$, and nullary functions $\alpha_i$ and $\beta_j$ with $i > h$ and $j > l$, denoted $f_{\alpha_i}$ and $f_{\beta_j}$, respectively. Without loss of generality, we discipline $\alpha$-renaming to guarantee that such names are never restricted in the process.

We now introduce the dynamic compilation of terms at run-time.

Definition 14 (Dynamic Compilation) The $(\mathcal{F}, h, l)$-dynamic compilation is the function $\rho : T_{\Sigma ZK} \rightarrow T_{\Sigma h l}$ recursively defined as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\text{Public}<em>{\xi}(M)</em>\rho$</td>
<td>$\text{Public}<em>{\xi}(M</em>\rho)$ if $j \in [1, l]$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$\text{FakePublic}(j, M_\rho)$ otherwise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\text{ZK}<em>{i,j}(\vec{M}, \vec{N}, F)</em>\rho$</td>
<td>$\text{ZK}<em>{i,j}(\vec{M</em>\rho}, \vec{N_\rho})$ if $(i, j, F) \in \mathcal{F}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$\text{FakeZK}(g, \vec{N_k_\rho}, F_\rho)$ otherwise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\text{Formula}(M)_\rho$</td>
<td>$\text{Formula}(M_\rho)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\alpha_i_\rho$</td>
<td>$\alpha_i$ if $i \in [1, h]$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$f_{\alpha_i}$ otherwise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\beta_j_\rho$</td>
<td>$\beta_j$ if $j \in [1, l]$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$f_{\beta_j}$ otherwise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\text{Ver}<em>{i,j}(F, M)</em>\rho$</td>
<td>$\text{Ver}<em>{i,j}(F</em>\rho, M_\rho)$ if $(i, j, F) \in \mathcal{F}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$\text{FakeVer}(i, j, F_\rho, M_\rho)$ otherwise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$f(M_1, \ldots, M_i)_\rho$</td>
<td>$f(M_1_\rho, \ldots, M_i_\rho)$ if $\forall f \in \Sigma_{\text{base}}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$x_\rho$</td>
<td>$x$ if $\forall x$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$n_\rho$</td>
<td>$n$ if $\forall n$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The next proposition states that $\rho$ is closed under variable substitution.

Proposition 2 (Closure of Dynamic Compilation) Let $\rho$ be the $(\mathcal{F}, h, l)$-dynamic compilation. For every frame $\phi$ and every term $M$ in $(\mathcal{F}, h, l)$-normal form with respect to $\phi$, we have $(M_\rho)\phi_\rho = (M_\phi)_\rho$. 
We next lemma states that term equality is preserved by dynamic compilation.

**Lemma 1 (Preservation of Term Equality)** Let \( \phi \) be an \((\mathcal{F}, h, l)\)-valid frame and \( \rho \) be the \((\mathcal{F}, h, l)\)-dynamic compilation. Then for any ground terms \( M_1, M_2 \in T_{\Sigma_{\text{ZK}}} \) in \((\mathcal{F}, h, l)\)-normal form with respect to \( \phi \), we have \( E_{\text{ZK}} \vdash M_1 = M_2 \iff E_{\text{FZK}}^{\mathcal{F}, h, l} \vdash M_1 \rho = M_2 \rho \).

**Proof.** We prove the \( \Rightarrow \) implication by induction on the length of the derivation of \( M_1 \). We first discuss the interesting base cases:

\[
M_1 = \text{Public}_k(\text{ZK}_{i,j}(\tilde{M}, \tilde{N}, F)), M_2 = N_k \quad \text{We have two cases:}
\]

1. \((i, j, F) \in \mathcal{F} \): By definition of \( \rho \) (cf. Definition \ref{def:dynamic-compilation}), we get \( M_1 \rho = \text{Public}_k(\text{ZK}_{i,j}^F(\tilde{M} \rho, \tilde{N} \rho)) \). By definition of \( E_{\text{FZK}}^{\mathcal{F}, h, l} \) (cf. Table \ref{table:equational-theory}), we get \( E_{\text{FZK}}^{\mathcal{F}, h, l} \vdash \text{Public}_k(\text{ZK}_{i,j}^F(\tilde{M} \rho, \tilde{N} \rho)) = N_k \rho \), as desired.

2. \((i, j, F) \notin \mathcal{F} \): By definition of \( \rho \), we can derive that \( M_1 \rho = \text{Public}_k(\text{FakeZK}_{\min(i,j)}(\text{FakeCollect}(i, j, \tilde{M} \rho, \tilde{N} \rho), \tilde{N}_{\min(i,j)}), F \rho) \). By definition of \( E_{\text{FZK}}^{\mathcal{F}, h, l} \), \( E_{\text{FZK}}^{\mathcal{F}, h, l} \vdash M_1 \rho = N_k \rho \), as desired.

\[
M_1 = \text{Formula}(\text{ZK}_{i,j}(\tilde{M}, \tilde{N}, F)), M_2 = F \quad \text{We have two cases:}
\]

1. \((i, j, F) \in \mathcal{F} \): By definition of \( \rho \), we get \( M_1 \rho = \text{Formula}(\text{ZK}_{i,j}^F(\tilde{M} \rho, \tilde{N} \rho)) \). By definition of \( E_{\text{FZK}}^{\mathcal{F}, h, l} \), we get \( E_{\text{FZK}}^{\mathcal{F}, h, l} \vdash \text{Formula}(\text{ZK}_{i,j}^F(\tilde{M} \rho, \tilde{N} \rho)) = F \) and, since \( M_1 \) is in \((\mathcal{F}, h, l)\)-normal form with respect to \( \phi \), by definition of \( \rho \) we have that \( F \rho = F \), as desired.

2. \((i, j, F) \notin \mathcal{F} \): By Definition \ref{def:dynamic-compilation} we obtain \( M_1 \rho = \text{Formula}(\text{FakeZK}_{\min(i,j)}(\text{FakeCollect}(i, j, \tilde{M} \rho, \tilde{N} \rho), \tilde{N}_{\min(i,j)}), F \rho) \). By an inspection of Table \ref{table:equational-theory} we have \( E_{\text{FZK}}^{\mathcal{F}, h, l} \vdash M_1 \rho = F \rho \), as desired.

\[
M_1 = \text{Ver}(F, \text{ZK}_{i,j}(\tilde{M}, \tilde{N}, F)) \quad \text{and} \quad M_2 = \text{true} \quad \text{It must be the case that} \quad (i, j, F) \in \mathcal{F}, \quad \text{otherwise} \quad M_1 \text{ is not in} \quad (\mathcal{F}, h, l)\text{-normal form with respect to} \quad \phi. \quad \text{By definition of} \quad \rho, \quad M_1 \rho = \text{Ver}^F_{i,j}(\text{ZK}_{i,j}^F(\tilde{M} \rho, \tilde{N} \rho)) \text{.} \quad \text{By the equational theory of Table} \ref{table:equational-theory} \quad E_{\text{FZK}}^{\mathcal{F}, h, l} \vdash M_1 \rho = \text{true}, \quad \text{as desired.}
\]

We prove the induction step by cases:

**Symmetry** We have that \( E_{\text{ZK}} \vdash M_1 = M_2 \) is proved by symmetry from \( E_{\text{ZK}} \vdash M_2 = M_1 \). By induction hypothesis, \( E_{\text{FZK}}^{\mathcal{F}, h, l} \vdash M_2 \rho = M_1 \rho \). The result follows by symmetry of \( E_{\text{FZK}}^{\mathcal{F}, h, l} \).

**Transitivity** The result follows directly from the induction hypothesis.

The proof of the \( \Leftarrow \) implication is similar and relies on the fact that \( \rho \) is injective when applied to terms in \((\mathcal{F}, h, l)\)-normal form with respect to \( \phi \). \( \square \)

Exploiting that term equality is preserved under dynamic compilation, we proceed by showing the preservation of process reduction. The following lemma also proves that the validity of extended processes is preserved by internal reduction and labelled transition, up to structural equivalence. In addition, Theorem \ref{thm:preservation-process-reduction} constitutes a direct consequence of this lemma.

**Lemma 2 (Preservation of Process Reduction)** Let \( \Lambda \) be an extended process such that \( \Lambda \equiv E_{\text{ZK}} \circ \nu \tilde{v} \tilde{v} \tilde{y}.(\{\tilde{M}/\tilde{x}\}|P) \), for some \((\mathcal{F}, h, l)\)-valid extended process \( \nu \tilde{v} \tilde{v} \tilde{y}.(\{\tilde{M}/\tilde{x}\}|P) \), let \( \sigma \) be the \((\mathcal{F}, h, l)\)-static compilation, and let \( \rho \) be the \((\mathcal{F}, h, l)\)-dynamic compilation. Then the following statements hold:
1. For every $B$, $A \rightarrow_{E_\Sigma} B$ if and only if there exists an $(F, h, l)$-valid extended process $\nu_{1,2} M, \nu M \hat{y} \left(\{M'/x\}\right) P' \equiv_{E_{FZK}} B$ such that $\nu_{1,2} M, \nu M \hat{y} \left(\{M'/x\}\right) P' \rightarrow_{E_{FZK}} \nu_{1,2} M, \nu M \hat{y} \left(\{M'/x\}\right) P' \sigma$.

2. For every $\mu$ containing only terms in $(F, h, l)$-normal form with respect to $\nu_{1,2} M, \nu M \hat{y} \left(\{M'/x\}\right)$ and every $B$, $A \rightarrow_{E_{FZK}} B$ if and only if there exists an $(F, h, l)$-valid extended process $\nu_{1,2} M, \nu M \hat{y} \left(\{M'/x\}\right) P' \equiv_{E_{FZK}} B$ such that $\nu_{1,2} M, \nu M \hat{y} \left(\{M'/x\}\right) P' \rightarrow_{E_{FZK}} \nu_{1,2} M, \nu M \hat{y} \left(\{M'/x\}\right) P' \sigma$ where

- if $\mu = a(M)$, then $\hat{1} = \hat{1}'$, $\hat{y}' = \hat{y}$, for some $x \notin \{x\}$, and $\{M'/x\} = \{M'/x\}$.
- if $\mu = \pi(b)$, then $\hat{1} = \hat{1}'$, $\hat{y}' = \hat{y}$, and $\{M'/x\} = \{M'/x\}$.
- if $\mu = \nu b.\pi(b)$, then $\hat{1} = (\hat{1}', b)$, $\hat{y}' = \hat{y}$, and $\{M'/x\} = \{M'/x\}$.
- if $\mu = \nu x.\pi(x)$, then $\hat{1} = \hat{1}'$, $\hat{y}' = \hat{y}$, and $\{M'/x\} = \{M'/x\}$, for some $(F, h, l)$-valid $M$.

Proof. We prove statement 1 by cases on the internal reduction rule. Let us first deal with the “only if” implication.

COMM By an inspection of Table 2, there exist $M, x, Q, P_1, P_2$ such that $\nu_{1,2} M, \nu M \hat{y} \left(\{M'/x\}\right) P \equiv_{E_{FZK}} \nu_{1,2} M, \nu M \hat{y} \left(\{M'/x\}\right) P \mid \pi(M). P_1 \mid a(x). P_2$ and $Q \mid \pi(M). P_1 \mid a(x). P_2$ is $(F, h, l)$-valid. By $\alpha$-renaming, we can assume that $x \notin f\text{v}(P_1)$. We also have that $B \equiv_{E_{FZK}} \nu_{1,2} M, \nu M \hat{y} \left(\{M'/x\}\right) P \mid P_1 \mid P_2 \{M/x\}$.

By ALIAS, RES-PAR, and SUBST, we get $\nu_{1,2} M, \nu M \hat{y} \left(\{M'/x\}\right) P \equiv_{E_{FZK}} \nu_{1,2} M, \nu M \hat{y} \left(\{M'/x\}\right) P \mid \{M'/x\} \mid Q \mid \pi(M). P_1 \mid a(x). P_2$. Since $\sigma$ behaves as the identity function on variables and names and it is defined on $(F, h, l)$-valid terms and processes, we get $\nu_{1,2} M, \nu M \hat{y} \left(\{M'/x\}\right) P \sigma \equiv_{E_{FZK}} \nu_{1,2} M, \nu M \hat{y} \left(\{M'/x\}\right) P \mid \{M'/x\} \mid Q \mid \pi(M). P_1 \mid a(x). P_2 \sigma$.

By COMM, SUBST, RES-PAR, and ALIAS, we have that $\nu_{1,2} M, \nu M \hat{y} \left(\{M'/x\}\right) P \sigma \equiv_{E_{FZK}} \nu_{1,2} M, \nu M \hat{y} \left(\{M'/x\}\right) P \mid \{M'/x\} \mid Q \sigma \mid \pi(M). P_1 \sigma \mid a(x). P_2 \sigma$.

Then By an inspection of Table 2, there exist $M, N, Q, P_1, P_2$ such that $\nu_{1,2} M, \nu M \hat{y} \left(\{M'/x\}\right) P \equiv_{E_{FZK}} \nu_{1,2} M, \nu M \hat{y} \left(\{M'/x\}\right) P \mid \{M'/x\} \mid Q \mid (M = N) \text{ then } P_1 \text{ else } P_2$.

We also have that $B \equiv_{E_{FZK}} P_2$. Similarly, by applying SUBST, we get $\nu_{1,2} M, \nu M \hat{y} \left(\{M'/x\}\right) P \equiv_{E_{FZK}} \nu_{1,2} M, \nu M \hat{y} \left(\{M'/x\}\right) P \mid \{M'/x\} \mid Q \mid (M = N) \text{ then } P_1 \text{ else } P_2 \sigma$.

When $M$ is in $(F, h, l)$-normal form with respect to $\nu_{1,2} M, \nu M \hat{y} \left(\{M'/x\}\right)$ and $M$ is $(F, h, l)$-valid, it is easy to see that $E_{FZK} \vdash (\{M\}) \nu_{1,2} M, \nu M \hat{y} \left(\{M'/x\}\right) P \equiv_{E_{FZK}} \nu_{1,2} M, \nu M \hat{y} \left(\{M'/x\}\right) P \mid \{M'/x\} \mid Q \sigma \mid \pi(M). P_1 \sigma \mid a(x). P_2 \sigma$.

ELSE The reasoning is similar to the one in the previous item.

Notice that the previous cases cover both the application of evaluation contexts and the closure by structural equivalence. The proof for the “if” implication is similar and relies on the fact that $\rho$ is injective when applied to terms in $(F, h, l)$-normal form.

We now prove that process reduction, as defined by the labelled transition systems, is preserved as well. We proceed by cases on the label $\mu$:
\( \mu = a(M) \) By an inspection of Table \( \square \), there exist \( x, P', Q \) such that \( \nu \vdash \nu_x \cdot \nu_y \cdot (\{M/x\} | P) \equiv_{E_{2k}} \nu_x \cdot \nu_y \cdot (\{M/x\} | a(x).P' | Q) \) and \( B \equiv_{E_{2k}} \nu_x \cdot \nu_y \cdot (\{M/x\} | P'). \) Similarly, we have that \( \nu_x \cdot \nu_y \cdot (\{M/x\} | b \neq \nu \), and \( \nu_x \cdot \nu_y \cdot (\{M/x\} | B) \equiv_{E_{2k}} \nu_x \cdot \nu_y \cdot (\{M/x\} | P'). \) By \( \text{SCOPE} \), we derive free(M) \( \forall \{\mu, \nu\} = 0. \) By \( \text{IN}, \text{ALIAS}, \text{SUBST}, \text{and RES-PAR} \), we get \( \nu_x \cdot \nu_y \cdot (\{M/x\} | ZK \vdash \nu_x \cdot \nu_y \cdot (\{M/x\} | a(x).P' | Q). \) The result follows from \( \text{OUT-ATOM} \) and \( \text{SCOPE}. \)

\( \mu = \nu \cdot a(b) \) The output term is a free channel. We have that \( \nu \vdash \nu_x \cdot \nu_y \cdot (\{M/x\} | \nu \cdot P \equiv_{E_{2k}} \nu \cdot \nu_x \cdot \nu_y \cdot (\{M/x\} | P'). \) By \( \text{SCOPE} \), \( \alpha \neq \nu \), and \( b \neq \nu \). Similarly, we have that \( \nu \vdash \nu_x \cdot \nu_y \cdot (\{M/x\} | P \equiv_{E_{2k}} \nu \cdot \nu_x \cdot \nu_y \cdot (\{M/x\} | \nu \cdot P'). \) The result follows from \( \text{OUT-ATOM} \) and \( \text{OPEN-ATOM}. \)

\( \mu = \nu \cdot a(b) \) The output term is a private channel. We have that \( \nu \vdash \nu_x \cdot \nu_y \cdot (\{M/x\} | P \equiv_{E_{2k}} \nu \cdot \nu_x \cdot \nu_y \cdot (\{M/x\} | P'). \) Similarly, \( \nu \vdash \nu_x \cdot \nu_y \cdot (\{M/x\} | P \equiv_{E_{2k}} \nu \cdot \nu_x \cdot \nu_y \cdot (\{M/x\} | P'). \) The result follows from \( \text{OUT-ATOM} \) and \( \text{OPEN-ATOM}. \)

In all cases, it is easy to see that the resulting extended process is \((\mathcal{F}, h, l)-\)valid. The proof for the “if” implication is similar and relies on the fact that \( \rho \) is injective when applied to terms in \((\mathcal{F}, h, l)\)-normal form.

We are finally ready to prove that the dynamic compilation preserves static equivalence. We first characterize a notion of similarity for frames. The crucial ingredient of this definition is that the two frames coincide when restricted to bound variables, i.e., if the terms received as input by the corresponding extended processes coincide. This property is naturally fulfilled by the frames associated to labelled bisimilar extended processes.

The next lemma says that a test succeeds if and only if its compilation does.

**Lemma 3 (Test Preservation)** Let \( \phi \) be an \((\mathcal{F}, h, l)\)-valid frame and \( \rho \) be the \((\mathcal{F}, h, l)\)-dynamic compilation. For every \( M, N \) in \((\mathcal{F}, h, l)\)-normal form with respect to \( \phi \) such that \((\text{free}(M) \cup \text{free}(N)) \cap \text{bound}(\phi) = \emptyset \), we have that \((M = N) \iff (M \rho = N \rho) \phi \rho\).

**Proof.** The proof follows from Lemma \( \blacksquare \) and Proposition \( \blacksquare \)

The next definition introduces the notion of similarity for frames.

**Definition 15 (Frame Similarity)** Two frames \( \phi \) and \( \psi \) are similar, written \( \phi \sim \psi \), if and only if the following conditions hold:

1. There exist \( \mathcal{F}, h, \) and \( l \) such that \( \phi \) and \( \psi \) are \((\mathcal{F}, h, l)\)-valid frames.
2. \( \phi = \nu \vdash \nu_x \cdot \nu_y \cdot (\{M/x\} \mid \{N/x\}) \) and \( \psi = \nu \vdash \nu_x \cdot \nu_y \cdot (\{M/x\} \mid \{N/x\}). \)
3. For every \( x_i \in \text{bv}(\phi) \), we have \( M_i = N_i \).

The next lemma says that for testing similar frames, it suffices to only consider terms in \((\mathcal{F}, h, l)\)-normal form.
Lemma 4 (Valid Tests) Let $\phi$ and $\psi$ be two $(\mathcal{F}, h, l)$-valid and similar frames. For every $M, N$ such that $(M = N)\phi$ holds and $(M = N)\psi$ does not hold, there exist $M', N'$ in $(\mathcal{F}, h, l)$-normal form with respect to $\phi$ and $\psi$ such that $(M' = N')\phi$ holds and $(M' = N')\psi$ does not hold.

Proof. We first show that it is possible to replace $M$ by a term $M'$ such that every subterm of the form $\mathrm{Public}_j(Z)$ is in $(\mathcal{F}, h, l)$-normal form with respect to $\phi$.

$M = T[\mathrm{Public}_j(Z)]$ and $E_{\Sigma}\vdash Z\phi = \mathrm{ZKi}, j'(\tilde{M}, \tilde{N}, F)$, with $j' \geq j > l$. By an inspection of the equational theory, we have two cases:

- There exists $Z' = \mathrm{ZKi}, j'(\tilde{M}', \tilde{N}', F') \in \text{terms}(Z)$ such that $E_{\Sigma}\vdash Z'\phi = \mathrm{ZKi}, j'(\tilde{M}, \tilde{N}, F)$. Therefore, $E_{\Sigma}\vdash \mathrm{Public}_j(Z)\phi = N_j'\phi$. If $E_{\Sigma}\vdash \mathrm{Public}_j(Z)\psi = N_j'\psi$, then we can replace $\mathrm{Public}_j(Z)$ by $N_j'$. Otherwise, we have that $(Z = Z')\phi$ holds and $(Z = Z')\psi$ does not hold, as desired.

- There exists a variable $x \in \text{terms}(Z)$ such that $\mathrm{ZKi}, j'(\tilde{M}', \tilde{N}', F') \in \text{terms}(x\phi)$ and $E_{\Sigma}\vdash \mathrm{ZKi}, j'(\tilde{M}', \tilde{N}', F') = \mathrm{ZKi}, j'(\tilde{M}, \tilde{N}, F)$. By definition 13 and definition 15 there exists a variable $y \in \text{bound}(\phi) \cap \text{bound}(\psi)$ and a term $Z$ bound to $y$ in $\phi$ and $\psi$ such that $\mathrm{ZKi}, j'(\tilde{M}'', \tilde{N}'', F'') \in \text{terms}(Z)$, free($Z$) $\cap$ bound($\phi$) = $\emptyset$, and $N_j''\phi = N_j$. If $E_{\Sigma}\vdash \mathrm{Public}_j(Z)\psi = N_j''\psi$, then we can replace $\mathrm{Public}_j(Z)$ by $N_j''$. Otherwise, $(Z = \mathrm{ZKi}, j'(\tilde{M}'', \tilde{N}'', F''))\phi$ holds and $(Z = \mathrm{ZKi}, j'(\tilde{M}'', \tilde{N}'', F''))\psi$ does not hold, as desired. By Definition 13 $\mathrm{ZKi}, j'(\tilde{M}'', \tilde{N}'', F'')$ and $N_j''$ are in normal form with respect to $\phi$ and $\psi$.

We can similarly prove that it is possible to remove every subterm of the form $\text{Ver}_i,j(F, Z)$ that is not in $(\mathcal{F}, h, l)$-normal form. At the end of such a process, possibly applied to $N$, we get two terms $M'$ and $N'$ in $(\mathcal{F}, h, l)$-normal form with respect to $\phi$ and $\psi$ such that $(M' = N')\phi$ holds and $(M' = N')\psi$ does not hold, as desired. \hfill $\square$

We can now formulate the theorem stating that verifying static equivalence on frames obtained by the encoding suffices to prove static equivalence on the original frames.

Lemma 5 (Preservation of Static Equivalence) Let $\phi$ and $\psi$ be similar and $(\mathcal{F}, h, l)$-valid frames. Let $\rho$ be the $(\mathcal{F}, h, l)$-dynamic compilation. If $\phi_\rho \approx_{E_{\Sigma}\Sigma'}^{\phi} \psi_\rho$ then $\phi \approx_{E_{\Sigma}\Sigma'}^{\phi} \psi$.

Proof. By Definition 10 we have to prove that $E_{\Sigma}\vdash (M = N)\phi \Leftrightarrow E_{\Sigma}\vdash (M = N)\psi$, for every $M, N \in T_{\Sigma,\Sigma'}$, only if $E_{\Sigma'}^{\mathcal{F}, h, l} \vdash (M' = N')\phi_\rho \Leftrightarrow E_{\Sigma'}^{\mathcal{F}, h, l} \vdash (M' = N')\psi_\rho$, for every $M', N' \in T_{\Sigma,\Sigma'}^{\mathcal{F}, h, l}$. Suppose that there exist $M, N$ such that $(M = N)\phi$ holds and $(M = N)\psi$ does not hold. By Lemma 4 we can assume that $M$ and $N$ are in $(\mathcal{F}, h, l)$-normal form with respect to $\phi$ and $\psi$. By Lemma 3 $(M_\rho = N_\rho)\phi_\rho$ holds and $(M_\rho = N_\rho)\psi_\rho$ does not hold. Therefore, $\phi_\rho$ and $\psi_\rho$ are not statically equivalent, yielding a contradiction. \hfill $\square$

The following lemma asserts that the equivalence of the terms occurring in input labels does not affect labelled bisimilarity.

Lemma 6 (Equivalent Labels) Let $A$ and $B$ be extended processes such that $A \overset{\alpha(M)}{\rightarrow} A'$, $B \overset{\alpha(M)}{\rightarrow} B'$, and $\phi(A) \approx_{E_{\Sigma}\Sigma'}^{\phi} \phi(B)$. Then for every $N$ such that $E_{\Sigma}\vdash M\phi(A) = N\phi(A)$ and $A \overset{\alpha(N)}{\rightarrow} A'$, we have that $B \overset{\alpha(N)}{\rightarrow} B'$. 

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Proof. Since the frames of the two extended processes are statically equivalent, we have that \( E_{\text{ZK}} \vdash M \phi(B) = N \phi(B) \) and \( \text{dom}(\phi(A)) = \text{dom}(\phi(B)) \). Possibly after applying \( \alpha \)-renaming on bound names, we get the result by applying IN, SCOPE, and STRUCT.

We can finally show that verifying labelled bisimilarity on extended processes obtained by the compilation suffices to prove labelled bisimilarity on the original extended processes. With Theorem 3 this proves Theorem 1 as desired. In the following, for every \((F, h, l)\)-valid \( A = v\nu_i.v\nu_j.(\{M/\bar{x}\}|P) \), we write \( A \rho \sigma \) to denote \( \nu_i.v\nu_j.(\{M/\bar{x}\})\rho|P\sigma \).

Lemma 7 (Preservation of Labelled Bisimilarity) Let \( A, B \) be extended processes such that \( A = v\nu_i.v\nu_j.(\{M/\bar{x}\}|P), B = v\nu'_i.v\nu'_j.(\{M'/\bar{x}\}|P') \), for some \((F, h, l)\)-valid \( P \) and \( P' \) and \( \nu_i.v\nu_j.(\{M/\bar{x}\}) \sim \nu'_i.v\nu'_j.(\{M'/\bar{x}\}) \). Let \( \sigma \) be the \((F, h, l)\) static compilation and \( \rho \) be the \((F, h, l)\) dynamic compilation. If \( A \rho \sigma \approx_{E_{\text{ZK}},h,l} B \rho \sigma \), then \( A \approx_{E_{\text{ZK}}} B \).

Proof. Since \( A \rho \sigma \approx_{E_{\text{ZK}},h,l} B \rho \sigma \), we can consider the smallest symmetric relation \( R' \subseteq \approx_{E_{\text{ZK}},h,l} \) satisfying the conditions 1, 2, and 3 of Definition 11 and such that \( A \rho \sigma R' B \rho \sigma \). Given \( \rho \) and \( \sigma \), let us define the relation \( R \) as the smallest symmetric relation satisfying the following conditions:

1. for every \((F, h, l)\)-valid \( A, B \) such that \( A \rho \sigma R' B \rho \sigma \) and \( \phi(A \rho \sigma) \sim \phi(B \rho \sigma) \), we have that \( ARB \).
2. for every \( A, B, A', B' \) such that \( A \equiv_{E_{\text{ZK}}} A' \) and \( B \equiv_{E_{\text{ZK}}} B' \), we have that \( A'RB' \).

We want to prove that \( R \) satisfies the conditions 1, 2, and 3 of Definition 11.

Condition 1 We want to prove that for every \( A, B \) such that \( ARB \), we have that \( \phi(A) \approx_{E_{\text{ZK}}} \phi(B) \). If \( ARB \), then there exist \((F, h, l)\)-valid \( A' \) and \( B' \) such that \( A \equiv_{E_{\text{ZK}}} A', B \equiv_{E_{\text{ZK}}} B', \) and \( A' \rho \sigma R' B' \rho \sigma \). By definition of \( R' \), \( \phi(A' \rho \sigma) \sim \phi(B' \rho \sigma) \) and \( \phi(A' \rho \sigma) \approx_{E_{\text{ZK}}} \phi(B' \rho \sigma) \). It is easy to see that \( \phi(A') \sim \phi(B') \). By Lemma 8 \( \phi(A') \approx_{E_{\text{ZK}}} \phi(B') \). Since structural equivalence preserves static equivalence, \( \phi(A) \approx_{E_{\text{ZK}}} \phi(B) \), as desired.

Condition 2 We want to prove that for every \( A, B \) such that \( ARB \), we have that (if \( A \rightarrow A_1 \), then \( B \rightarrow^* B_1 \) and \( A_1 \equiv_{E_{\text{ZK}}} B_1 \) for some \( B' \)). If \( ARB \), then there exist \((F, h, l)\)-valid \( A' \) and \( B' \) such that \( A \equiv_{E_{\text{ZK}}} A', B \equiv_{E_{\text{ZK}}} B', A' \rho \sigma R' B' \rho \sigma \). By Lemma 2 for every \( A_1 \) such that \( A \rightarrow A_1 \), there exists a \((F, h, l)\)-valid \( A'_1 \) such that \( A' \rightarrow A'_1, A'_1 \equiv_{E_{\text{ZK}}} A_1, \) and \( A' \rho \sigma \rightarrow A'_1 \rho \sigma \); we can find similar \( B_1 \) and \( B'_1 \) for \( B \) and \( B' \), respectively. By Lemma 2 and Definition 15 it is easy to see that \( \phi(A'_1 \rho \sigma) \sim \phi(B'_1 \rho \sigma) \). By definition of \( R' \), \( A'_1 \equiv_{E_{\text{ZK}}} B'_1 \) and, since \( \rho \) is closed by structural equivalence, \( A_1 \equiv_{E_{\text{ZK}}} B_1 \), as desired.

Condition 3 We want to prove that for every \( A, B \) such that \( ARB \), we have that (if \( A \mu \rightarrow A_1 \) and \( f\mu(B) \subseteq \text{dom}(A) \) and \( bn(\mu) \cap fn(B) = \emptyset \), then \( B \rightarrow^* \mu \rightarrow^* B_1 \) and \( A_1 \equiv_{E_{\text{ZK}}} B_1 \) for some \( B_1 \)). If \( ARB \), then there exist \((F, h, l)\)-valid \( A' \) and \( B' \) such that \( A \equiv_{E_{\text{ZK}}} A', B \equiv_{E_{\text{ZK}}} B', A' \rho \sigma R' B' \rho \sigma \). By Lemma 2 and Lemma 6 for every \( A_1 \) such that \( A \mu \rightarrow A_1 \), there exists a \((F, h, l)\)-valid \( A'_1 \) such that \( A' \mu \rightarrow A'_1, A'_1 \equiv_{E_{\text{ZK}}} A_1, \) and \( A' \rho \sigma \rightarrow A'_1 \rho \sigma \); we can find similar \( B_1 \) and \( B'_1 \) for \( B \) and \( B' \), respectively. By Lemma 2 and Definition 15 it is easy to see that \( \phi(A'_1 \rho \sigma) \sim \phi(B'_1 \rho \sigma) \). By definition of \( R' \), \( A'_1 \equiv_{E_{\text{ZK}}} B'_1 \) and, since \( \rho \) is closed by structural equivalence, \( A_1 \equiv_{E_{\text{ZK}}} B_1 \), as desired.

Therefore \( A \approx_{E_{\text{ZK}}} B \), as desired.
Theorem 1 then follows directly from Lemma 7 since \( \approx_1 \) and \( \approx \) coincide in the applied pi-calculus.

In some cases, the analysis of observational equivalence using the tool ProVerif [24] does not terminate due to the presence of the constructors \( \land \) and \( \lor \) and their equations. In these cases, it is useful to remove \( \land \) and \( \lor \) from the equational theory if they are not used in the protocol. Protocols often contain these constructors only in the formulas of zero-knowledge proofs. Then, after compilation, the protocol does not contain \( \land \) and \( \lor \) any more, but the equational theory produced by the compiler does. In these cases, the following theorem often allows to modify the equational theory produced by the compiler in such a way that \( \land \) and \( \lor \) do not occur any more:

**Theorem 4 (Unfolding)** Given \( \mathcal{F}, h, l \), let \( E^{\mathcal{F}, h, l}_{\text{FZK}} \) be the equational theory defined in Table 4. Let \( \mathcal{F}' \subseteq \mathcal{F} \) and \( \tilde{\tau}_{i,j,F}, \ldots, \tilde{\tau}_{i,j,F} \) be tuples of arity \( i + j \) associated to each \( (i, j, F) \in \mathcal{F}' \), where \( n = n_{i,j,F} \). Assume that for every \( (i, j, F) \) and tuples \( \tilde{M} = M_1, \ldots, M_{i+j} \) of arity \( i + j \), we have that \( \exists k, \sigma \) such that \( \tilde{M} = \tilde{\tau}_{i,j,F} \sigma \Leftrightarrow E^{\mathcal{F}, h, l}_{\text{FZK}} \vdash F\{M_1/\alpha_1, \ldots, M_{i+j}/\beta_{1,j}\} = \text{true} \), where \( \tilde{M}_1 = M_1, \ldots, M_i \) and \( \tilde{M}_{i+1,i+j} = M_{i+1}, \ldots, M_{i+j} \). Let \( E \) be obtained by replacing all the rules containing \( \text{PZK}^F_{i,j} \), for every \( (i, j, F) \in \mathcal{F}' \), by the following set of rules:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Ver}^F_{i,j}(\text{ZK}^F_{i,j}(\tilde{\tau}_{i,j,F})) &= \text{true}, \ldots, \text{Ver}^F_{i,j}(\text{ZK}^F_{i,j}(\tilde{\tau}_{i,j,F})) = \text{true} \\
\text{Public}^k(\text{ZK}^F_{i,j}(\tilde{x}, \tilde{y})) &= y_k \\
\text{Formula}(\text{ZK}^F_{i,j}(\tilde{x}, \tilde{y})) &= \emptyset
\end{align*}
\]

Then \( E^{\mathcal{F}, h, l}_{\text{FZK}} \semidownarrow \{ (M, N) \mid \text{PZK}^F_{i,j} \text{ occurs in } M \lor N \land (i, j, F) \in \mathcal{F}' \} = E \).

Note that \( E^{\mathcal{F}, h, l}_{\text{FZK}} \semidownarrow \{ (M, N) \mid \text{PZK}^F_{i,j} \text{ occurs in } M \lor N \land (i, j, F) \in \mathcal{F}' \} = E \) trivially implies the preservation of observational equivalence, since \( \text{PZK}^F_{i,j} \) is a private constructor not used in the protocol and thus never appears in terms produced by the protocol or the adversary.

**Proof.** All the equations defining \( E^{\mathcal{F}, h, l}_{\text{FZK}} \) and depending on \( \text{PZK}^F_{i,j} \) have a direct counterpart in the definition of \( E \). The only subtlety concerns the equations for the verification of zero-knowledge proofs: for every \( (i, j, F) \in \mathcal{F}' \), \( \tilde{M}, \tilde{N} \) such that \( F\{M_1/\alpha_1, \ldots, M_{i+j}/\beta_{1,j}\} = \text{true} \), \( E^{\mathcal{F}, h, l}_{\text{FZK}} \vdash \text{Ver}^F_{i,j}(\text{PZK}^F_{i,j}(\tilde{M}, \tilde{N}, \text{true})) \) true can be exploited to prove \( \text{Ver}^F_{i,j}(\text{ZK}^F_{i,j}(\tilde{M}, \tilde{N})) \) true. However, for every \( (i, j, F) \in \mathcal{F}' \), \( \tilde{M}, \tilde{N} \) there exist \( \tau_{i,j,F}, \sigma \) such that \( \tilde{M}, \tilde{N} = \tau \sigma \) if and only if \( E^{\mathcal{F}, h, l}_{\text{FZK}} \vdash F\{M_1/\alpha_1, \ldots, M_{i+j}/\beta_{1,j}\} = \text{true} \). Therefore \( E^{\mathcal{F}, h, l}_{\text{FZK}} \vdash \text{Ver}^F_{i,j}(\text{ZK}^F_{i,j}(\tilde{M}, \tilde{N})) \) true if and only if \( E \vdash \text{Ver}^F_{i,j}(\text{ZK}^F_{i,j}(\tilde{M}, \tilde{N})) \) true.

Additionally, after having removed all occurrences of \( \land \) and \( \lor \), we need to be able to remove their equational rules. The soundness of this transformation is shown by the following simple lemma:

**Lemma 8 (Removal of \( \land \) and \( \lor \))** Let \( E_0 \) be an equational theory with signature \( \Sigma_0 \) and \( \land \), \( \lor \) \( \notin \Sigma_0 \) and true \( \in \Sigma_0 \). Let \( \Sigma_1 := \Sigma_0 \cup \{ \land, \lor \} \) and let \( E_1 \) be the smallest equational theory over \( \Sigma_1 \) containing \( E_0 \) and the equations \( \{ \land(\text{true}, \text{true}) = \text{true}, \lor(\text{true}, x) = \text{true}, \lor(x, x) = \text{true} \} \). Let \( \Sigma_2 := \Sigma_1 \) and let \( E_2 \) be the smallest equational theory over \( \Sigma_2 \) containing \( E_0 \). Then for all processes \( P \) and \( Q \) not containing \( \land \) or \( \lor \), we have that \( P \approx_{E_1} Q \) if and only if \( P \approx_{E_2} Q \).

**Proof.** The proof has the same structure as the proof of Theorem 1. We first define a notion of normal form for \( T_{\Sigma_1} \) terms with respect to \( \phi \), requiring that for any term of the form \( \land(M_1, M_2) \) (resp. \( \lor(M_1, M_2) \) occurring therein, \( E_{\text{ZK}} \not\vdash M_1 \phi \) true or \( E_{\text{ZK}} \not\vdash M_2 \phi \) true (resp. \( E_{\text{ZK}} \not\vdash M_1 \phi \) true and \( E_{\text{ZK}} \not\vdash M_2 \phi \) true). We then define a notion of validity for terms and plain processes, which requires that \( \land \) and \( \lor \) do not occur therein. The definition of validity for frames and extended processes is similar to Definition 12 where the new definition of normal form and validity for terms and plain processes is taken into account. Finally, the compilation from \( T_{\Sigma_1} \) to \( T_{\Sigma_2} \) is simply defined as the identity function. It is easy to see that Proposition 2 and Lemma 7 still hold. Since the identity function is bijective, we have the double implication in Lemma 8 and Lemma 7 as desired.
The previous proof shows that the framework proposed in this section provides a methodology for proving the soundness of any transformation of equational theories for which Proposition 1, Proposition 2, and Lemma 1 hold.

5 Case Study: Direct Anonymous Attestation

To exemplify the applicability of our theory to real-world protocols, we analyze the security properties of the Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA) scheme [11]. DAA constitutes a cryptographic protocol that enables the remote authentication of a hardware module called the Trusted Platform Module (TPM), while preserving the privacy of the user owning the module. Such TPMs are now widely included in end-user notebooks.

The goal of the DAA protocol is to enable the TPM to sign arbitrary messages and to send them to an entity called the verifier in such a way that the verifier will only learn that a valid TPM signed that message, but without revealing the TPM’s identity. The DAA protocol relies heavily on zero-knowledge proofs to achieve anonymity.

The DAA protocol is composed of two subprotocols: the join protocol and the DAA-sign protocol. The join protocol allows a TPM to obtain a certificate from an entity called the issuer. The protocol ensures that even the issuer cannot link the TPM to its subsequently produced signatures. The DAA-sign protocol enables a TPM to sign a message. This signed message is then verified by the verifier. The DAA protocol includes also a rogue-tagging procedure preventing corrupted TPMs from getting certificates and authenticating messages.

Every TPM has a unique id as well as a key-pair called endorsement key (EK). The issuer is assumed to know the public component of each EK. We assume further a publicly known string $bsn_I$ called the basename of the issuer, as well as a publicly known unique string $bsn_V$ for each verifier $V$. Every TPM has a secret seed $daaseed_{id}$ that allows for deriving secret values $f_{cnt} := h(daaseed_{id},cnt)$. We will call $f_{cnt}$ the f-value for counter $cnt$. Each such f-value represents a virtual identity with respect to which the TPM can execute the join and the DAA-sign protocol.

5.1 Join protocol

In the join protocol, the TPM can receive a certificate for one of its f-values $f$ from the issuer. Such a certificate is basically just a signature on $f$ of the TPM. However, since we do not want the issuer to learn $f$, we have to use blind signatures, i.e., the request from the TPM to the issuer contains $\text{blind}(f, v)$, for some random $v$, instead of just $f$. Furthermore, for reasons that will become clear in the description of rogue-tagging below, the TPM is required to also send the hash value $N_I := \exp(\zeta_I,f)$ along with its request where $\zeta_I$ is a value derived from the issuer’s basename $bsn_I$. The function $\exp$ constitutes an exponentiation in the original specification of DAA; we model it as a hash function with two arguments. Since we do not want the TPM to use different f-values in the computation of $N_I$ and of $\text{blind}(f,v)$, we have to attach a ZK proof that the same f-value has been used in both cases. After checking the proof, the issuer signs the blinded f-value $\text{blind}(f,v)$ and returns this signature $x := \text{blindsign}(\text{blind}(f,v), sk_I)$. Then $\text{cert} := \text{unblind}(x,v)$ is a valid blind signature on $f$. This certificate $\text{cert}$ will be used for the DAA-sign protocol. Since we want to guarantee that only valid TPMs can receive certificates, the TPM authenticates all its communication by a challenge-response nonce handshake: the issuer outputs a nonce encrypted by the TPM’s public endorsement key, and the TPM proves its identity by hashing the nonce together with the blinded f-value $\text{blind}(f,v)$. The
join protocol has the following overall shape:

\[
\text{TPM} \quad \text{Issuer} \\
\begin{array}{l}
\text{id, } \text{ZK} \left( f, v; \text{blind}(f, v), N_I, \zeta_I; F_{\text{join}} \right) \\
\text{enc}_{\text{asy}}(\text{nonce}, \text{pk}_I) \\
\text{h}(\text{blind}(f, v), \text{nonce}) \\
\text{blindsign}(\text{blind}(f, v), \text{sk}_I)
\end{array}
\]

with \( F_{\text{join}} := (\beta_1 = \text{blind}(\alpha_1, \alpha_2) \land \beta_2 = \exp(\beta_3, \alpha_1)) \) and with \( \text{id} \) being the id of the TPM. In our calculus, we can model the behavior of the TPM in the join protocol as follows:

\[
\text{tpmjoin} := \text{let } f = h(\text{pair}(\text{daaseed}(\text{id}), \text{cnt})) \text{ in } \\
\quad \nu \nu, \\
\quad \text{let } U = \text{blind}(f, v) \text{ in } \\
\quad \text{let } \zeta_I = h(\text{pair}(n_1, \text{bsn}_I)) \text{ in } \\
\quad \text{let } N_I = \text{exp}(\zeta_I, f) \text{ in } \\
\quad \text{let } \text{zkp} = \text{ZK}(f, v; U, N_I, \zeta_I; F_{\text{join}}) \text{ in } \\
\quad \text{pub}(\text{pair}(\text{id}, \text{zkp})). \\
\quad \text{pub}(\text{encn}). \\
\quad \text{let } \text{nonce} = \text{dec}_{\text{asy}}(\text{encn}, \text{sk}(\text{ek}(\text{id}))) \text{ in } \\
\quad \text{pub}(h((U, \text{nonce}))). \\
\quad \text{pub}(\text{x}). \\
\quad \text{let } \text{cert} = \text{unblind}(\text{x}, v) \text{ in } \\
\quad \text{if } \text{blindver}(\text{cert}, f, \text{pk}(\text{issuerK})) = \text{true} \text{ then } \\
\quad \text{event JOINED(}\text{id}, \text{cnt}, \text{cert}). \\
\quad \text{och(}\text{cert})
\]

Here we use \( \text{let } x = M \text{ in } P \) as syntactic sugar for \( P\{M/x\} \). The occurrence of an event \( M \) is modeled as \( \tau(M) \) where \( \tau \) is a distinguished channel used only for events. Given the explanations above, most steps in this process should be self-explanatory, however, a few points merit further explanation: The secret seed \( \text{daaseed}_\text{id} \) is modelled by the private constructor \( \text{daaseed} \) taking as input \( \text{id} \). In the computation of \( \zeta_I := h(\text{pair}(n_1, \text{bsn}_I)) \), \( n_1 \) is a free name. In the original DAA protocol [11], the integer 1 is used here. For communication with the issuer, we use the channel \( \text{pub} \). The public keys \( \text{pk}_I \) and \( \text{pk}_I \) are modeled as \( \text{pk}(\text{ek}(\text{id})) \) and \( \text{pk} \) where \( \text{ek} \) and \( \text{issuerK} \) are private constructors. That is, by \( \text{ek}(\text{id}) \) we model a secret function mapping a TPM’s identity to the endorsement key pair. We then use the operators \( \text{sk} \) and \( \text{pk} \) to access the secret and the public key. The function \( \text{issuerK} \) is nullary since, for the sake of simplicity, we model a single issuer. The private channel \( \text{och} \) will later be modeled as a secret channel to pass the received certificate to the DAA-sign process.
Accordingly, we model the issuer’s part in the join protocol as follows:

\[
\text{issuer} := \setminus \text{pub}(msg).
\]

\[
\text{let } id = \text{first}(msg) \text{ in}
\]

\[
\text{let } zkp = \text{snd}(msg) \text{ in}
\]

\[
\text{if } \text{Ver}_{2,3}(F_{\text{join}}; zkp) = \text{true} \text{ then}
\]

\[
\text{let } U = \text{Public}_1(zkp) \text{ in}
\]

\[
\nunonce.
\]

\[
\text{pub}(\text{enc}_{\text{asym}}(\text{nonce}, \text{pk}(\text{ek}(id)))),
\]

\[
\text{pub}(\text{hashn}).
\]

\[
\text{if } \text{hashn} = h((U, \text{nonce})) \text{ then}
\]

\[
\text{let } N = \text{Public}_2(zkp) \text{ in}
\]

\[
\text{let } \zeta = \text{Public}_3(zkp) \text{ in}
\]

\[
\text{if } \text{rogue} = \text{true} \text{ then } 0 \text{ else}
\]

\[
\text{if } \text{rogueid} = \text{true} \text{ then } 0 \text{ else}
\]

\[
\text{if } \zeta = h(\text{pair}(n_1, \text{bsn}_I)) \text{ then}
\]

\[
\text{let } \text{cert} = \text{blindsign}(U, \text{sk}(\text{issuerK})) \text{ in}
\]

\[
\text{event CERTIFIED}(id)
\]

\[
\text{pub}(\text{cert})
\]

In this process, \textit{rogue} and \textit{rogueid} represent predicates depending on \(N, \zeta\) and \textit{id}. These are used for the detection of rogue TPMs. We will specify \textit{rogue} and \textit{rogueid} in more detail below when we discuss rogue detection.

### 5.2 DAA-sign protocol

After successfully executing the join protocol, the TPM has a valid certificate \(\text{cert}\) for its f-value \(f\) signed by the issuer. Since we only want valid TPMs to be able to DAA-sign a message \(m\), the TPM will have to convince a verifier \(V\) that it possesses a valid certificate \(\text{cert}\). Of course, the TPM cannot directly send \(\text{cert}\) to the verifier \(V\), since this would reveal \(f\). Instead, the TPM produces a zero-knowledge proof \(zkp\) that it knows a valid certificate. If the TPM, however, would just send \((zkp, m)\) to the verifier, the protocol would be subject to a trivial message substitution attack. We instead combine \(m\) with the proof such that one can only replace \(m\) if one redoes the proof (and this again can only be done by knowing a valid certificate). Fortunately, this can easily be done in our formalism by including \(m\) in the public parameters of the zero-knowledge proof \(zkp\) (there is no condition that a parameter included in the proof actually has to be used by the formula). In this fashion we produce a kind of zero-knowledge signature that can only be forged if the attacker is able to produce a valid proof. Furthermore, we again include a value \(N := \exp(\zeta, f)\) whose importance will become clear below. The overall shape of the DAA-sign protocol is hence as follows:

\[
\begin{array}{ll}
\text{TPM} & \xrightarrow{\text{ZK}(f, \text{cert}; N, \zeta, \text{pk}_I, m; F_{\text{sign}})} \text{Verifier}
\end{array}
\]

with \(F_{\text{sign}} := \beta_1 = \exp(\beta_2, \alpha_1) \land \text{blindver}(\alpha_2, \alpha_1, \beta_3)\). An interesting point here is the choice of \(\zeta\). By prescribing different derivations of \(\zeta\), we get different modes of DAA-signing: an anonymous and a pseudonymous one. In case of anonymous DAA-signing, \(\zeta\) is a fresh name chosen by the host. In this case, two signatures by the same TPM will contain values \(N = \exp(\zeta, f)\) and \(N' = \exp(\zeta', f)\) for different \(\zeta, \zeta'\), so the attacker will not be able to link these signatures. In the case of pseudonymous DAA-signatures, however, we derive \(\zeta\) in a deterministic fashion from the basename \(\text{bsn}_V\) of the verifier. Then any two signatures for the same verifier using the same f-value will have the same value of \(N\); hence these signatures can be linked.
It will not be possible, however, to link these signatures to the execution of the join-protocol or to signatures for other verifiers. \( N \) takes the role of a verifier-specific pseudonym.

We now discuss how to write this protocol in our calculus. We start with the anonymous variant where \( \zeta \) is a fresh name.

\[
daasigna := \\
v_\zeta. \\
\text{let } f = h(\text{pair}(\text{daaseed}(id), cnt)) \text{ in} \\
\text{let } N = \exp(\zeta, f) \text{ in} \\
\text{let } zk p = \text{ZK}(f, cert; N, \zeta, \text{pk}(\text{issuerK}), m; F_{\text{sign}}) \text{ in} \\
\text{event DAASIGNEDA}(id, cnt, m). \\
\overline{\text{pub}(zk p)}
\]

\[
daavera := \\
\text{pub}(zk p). \\
\text{if } \text{Ver}_{2,4}(F_{\text{sign}}; zk p) = \text{true} \text{ then} \\
\text{let } N = \text{Public}_1(zk p) \text{ in} \\
\text{let } \zeta = \text{Public}_2(zk p) \text{ in} \\
\text{if } \text{Public}_3(zk p) = \text{pk}(\text{issuerK}) \text{ then} \\
\text{let } m = \text{Public}_4(zk p) \text{ in} \\
\text{if } \text{rogue} = \text{true} \text{ then } 0 \text{ else} \\
\text{event DAVERIFIEDA}(m)
\]

As in the case of the \text{issuer} process, \text{rogue} is a predicate depending on \( \zeta \) and \( N \) that we will elaborate upon further when we discuss rogue detection below. The pseudonymous variants of these processes are similarly defined: The pseudonymous DAA-signing process \text{daasignp} is defined like \text{daasigna}, except that \( \nu_\zeta \) is replaced by \text{let } \zeta = h(\text{pair}(n_1, bsn_V)) \text{ in} \cdot \text{The corresponding verification process } \text{daaverp} \text{ is defined like } \text{daavera}, \text{except that after } \text{let } \zeta = \text{Public}_2(zk p) \text{ in} \text{ we insert } \text{if } \zeta = h(\text{pair}(n_1, bsn_V)) \text{ then}. \text{Furthermore, to be able to formulate a more fine-grained authenticity property below, we output the more informative events } \text{DAASIGNEDP}(id, cnt, bsn_V, m) \text{ and } \text{DAVERIFIEDP}(m, bsn_V, N) \text{ instead of } \text{DAASIGNEDA}(id, cnt, m)\]
and DAAVERIFIEDA(m), respectively. These changes yield the following two processes:

\[
\text{daasign} := \text{let } \zeta = h(\text{pair}(n_V, bsn_V)) \text{ in } \\
\text{let } f = h(\text{pair}(\text{daaseed}(id), \text{cnt})) \text{ in } \\
\text{let } N = \exp(\zeta, f) \text{ in } \\
\text{let } \text{zkp} = \text{ZK}(f, cert; N, \zeta, \text{pk(issuerK), m; } F_{\text{sign}}) \text{ in } \\
\text{event } \text{DAAVERIFIEDA}(id, cnt, bsn_V, m).
\]

\[
\text{daaverp} := \text{pub}(\text{zkp}).
\]

\[
\text{if } \text{Ver}_{2,4}(F_{\text{sign}}; \text{zkp}) = \text{true then } \\
\text{let } N = \text{Public}_1(\text{zkp}) \text{ in } \\
\text{let } \zeta = \text{Public}_2(\text{zkp}) \text{ in } \\
\text{if } \zeta = h(\text{pair}(n_V, bsn_V)) \text{ then } \\
\text{if } \text{Public}_3(\text{zkp}) = \text{pk(issuerK)} \text{ then } \\
\text{let } m = \text{Public}_4(\text{zkp}) \text{ in } \\
\text{if } \text{rogue} = \text{true then 0 else } \\
\text{event } \text{DAAVERIFIEDA}(m, bsn_V, N)
\]

with \(n_V := n_1\). The most important changes with respect to the anonymous DAA-sign protocol are marked with (\(*\)). Note that we parametrized these processes with respect to the value \(n_V := n_1\) used in the computation of \(\zeta\). This is to be able to express the changes needed for circumventing the attack described in [28], see below.

### 5.3 Rogue-tagging

So far, we presented the DAA protocol under the assumption that no TPM is compromised. A TPM is a single chip so that it is very difficult to extract private information from a TPM. Extracting such private information is however not impossible, so we have to expect that a few TPMs can get compromised. But as soon as a single TPM is compromised, the attacker can sign arbitrary messages, and these signatures even cannot be traced to this specific TPM. Even worse, the attacker could release the f-value and a corresponding certificate on the Internet; this would allow everyone to fake DAA-signatures. To capture this last case, a so-called rogue list is introduced that contains all f-values that have been published on the Internet. Furthermore, the issuer maintains a list of revoked TPM ids. Since the communication with the issuer is authenticated, the issuer can refuse to issue certificates to a revoked TPM. Already issued certificates stay valid. To address this problem – note that in every protocol execution (join or DAA-sign) based on some f-value \(f\) – the TPM sends a pair \((\zeta, N)\) with \(N = \exp(\zeta, f)\). So given a list of rogue f-values \(F := \{f_1, \ldots, f_n\}\), we can check whether \(f \in F\) by checking whether \(N = \exp(\zeta, f_i)\) for some \(i \in [1, n]\). Thus the attacker cannot use a certificate relative to an f-value that has been marked rogue.

To model this mechanism in our calculus, we introduce two predicates \(\text{rogueid}\) and \(\text{rogue}\) in the issuer and verifier processes above. The predicate \(\text{rogueid}\) (used only be the issuer) is defined to evaluate to true iff the TPM id is marked rogue. So if, e.g., the ids \(id_1, id_2, id_3\) are marked rogue, we would set \(\text{rogueid} := (id = id_1 \lor id = id_2 \lor id = id_3)\). The predicate \(\text{rogue}\) checks whether \(N = \exp(\zeta, f')\) for some \(f'\) on the rogue list, so if, e.g., the f-values \(f_1, f_2, f_3\) were rogue-listed, we would define \(\text{rogue} := (N = \exp(\zeta, f_1) \lor N = \exp(\zeta, f_2) \lor N = \exp(\zeta, f_3))\).
5.4 Security properties of DAA

We will now discuss the main security properties of DAA and how to model them in our calculus.

5.4.1 Authenticity of the DAA-sign protocol

The first property we would like to model is authenticity: If the verifier accepts a message \( m \), then some TPM has DAA-signed this message \( m \). To model this, we consider the following process:

\[
\text{issuer} \xrightarrow{\text{pub}(\text{pk}(\text{issuerK}))} \text{TPMs} \xrightarrow{\text{daaver}} \text{daaverp}
\]

The output \( \text{pub}(\text{pk}(\text{issuerK})) \) reflects that the public key \( \text{pk}(\text{issuerK}) \) is publicly known. If we omitted this output, the adversary could not generate this term, since \( \text{issuerK} \) is a private name (otherwise the adversary would know \( \text{sk}(\text{issuerK}) \)). The subprocess \( \text{TPMs} \) reflects that we require authenticity to hold even if the adversary controls the execution of an arbitrary number of TPMs in an arbitrary fashion (except for learning their secrets). We model this process as follows:

\[
\text{TPMs} \xRightarrow{!\text{pub}(\text{cnt}).\nu\text{och}.(\text{tpmjoin} | (\text{och}(\text{cert})!.\text{pub}(\text{m}).(\text{daasigna}|\text{pub}(\text{bsn}_V).\text{daasignp})))).
\]

Thus for any pair of \( id, cnt \) received from the adversary, this process performs a join, and with the certificate \( cert \) received from the issuer, it DAA-signs any message \( m \) anonymously or pseudonymously with respect to arbitrary basenames \( bsn_V \). Note how we used inputs to bind the free variables \( id, cnt, m, bsn_V \) in \( \text{tpmjoin}, \text{daasigna}, \text{and daasignp} \).

Given this process, authenticity is defined as the fulfillment of the following two trace properties:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{DAAVERIFIEDP}(m, bsn, N) & \Rightarrow \text{DAASIGNEDP}(id, cnt, bsn, m) \\
\text{DAAVERIFIEDA}(m) & \Rightarrow (\text{DAASIGNEDA}(id, cnt, m) \lor \\
& \quad \text{DAASIGNEDP}(id, cnt, bsn, m)).
\end{align*}
\]

Intuitively, the first property means that if an event \( \text{DAAVERIFIEDP}(m, bsn, N) \) occurs, then also \( \text{DAASIGNEDP}(id, cnt, bsn, m) \) occurs in that trace with the same values of \( bsn \) and \( m \), i.e., when a verifier accepts a pseudonymously signed message \( m \), then a valid TPM actually sent that message \( m \) for that verifier. Similarly, the second property guarantees that if a verifier accepts a message as anonymously signed, that message has been signed anonymously or pseudonymously by some valid TPM. (An inspection of the protocol reveals that we cannot expect pseudonymously signed messages not to be accepted by anonymous verification.) We refer to [Definition 8] for a formal definition of these trace properties.

Trace properties such as the above authenticity properties can be verified with the mechanized prover ProVerif [9]. We applied the compilation described in Section 4 and feed the output – now a process in a finitely generated equational theory – to ProVerif. ProVerif successfully verifies the authenticity properties. The running time of this proof is 3 seconds on a Pentium 4, 3 GHz. A more detailed description of the necessary steps is given in [Section 6.2]. The tool implementing the compiler from Section 4.1 can be found at [6]. So far, we have not investigated the case that some TPMs are rogue-listed (i.e., \( rogue = \text{rogueid} = \text{false} \)). An analysis of this case can be found in [Section 6.2.3].

5.4.2 Authenticity of the Join Protocol

In contrast to the DAA-sign operation, after a join the issuer learns the identity of the joining party (since the joining party authenticates itself using its endorsement key). This is necessary for verifying that no rogue TPM joins but is also used to limit the number of times a given TPM can join with respect to different f-values.
It is therefore a natural question whether the following authenticity property holds: \( \text{JOINED}(id, cnt, cert) \Rightarrow \text{CERTIFIED}(id) \). We investigated whether this property holds in the following process which represents a situation where the attacker may corrupt or control arbitrary TPMs.

\[
!\text{pub}(id).\text{leaktpm}|\text{leakpublic}|\text{issuer}|\text{TPMs}||\text{daavera}||\text{daaverp}
\]

with

\[\text{leaktpm} := \text{event LEAKTPM}(id), \overline{\text{pub}(\text{daaseed}(id))}, \overline{\text{pub}(\text{sk}(\text{ek}(id)))}, \overline{\text{pub}(\text{pk}(\text{ek}(id)))}\]

and

\[\text{leakpublic} := \overline{\text{pub}(\text{pk}(\text{issuerK}))}!\text{pub}(id); \overline{\text{pub}(\text{pk}(\text{ek}(id)))}.
\]

As it turned out, ProVerif proves that the property is not fulfilled and finds the following attack:

The adversary corrupts TPM\(_B\) and retrieves its endorsement key. When the (uncorrupted) TPM\(_B\) joins, it sends a ZK proof \(Z\) containing some f-value \(f\) to the issuer and authenticates \(Z\) as coming from \(B\). The adversary intercepts \(Z\) and sends \(Z\) to the issuer and authenticates \(Z\) as coming from \(A\). The issuer checks the authentication and the ZK proof. Since the id of \(B\) is not included in the ZK proof\(^1\), the issuer accepts and issues a certificate for \(f\). Then the adversary forwards the certificate to \(B\) and \(B\) successfully checks the certificate. After this interaction, the issuer believes to have certified \(A\), and \(B\) has successfully joined. To the best of our knowledge, this attack was not known before. Note that this attack also applies to the original DAA protocol from \([11]\) without loosing efficiency by including the id of the TPM in the hash value \(c := h(c_h||n_t)\) (see the protocol description in \([11]\)).

Besides the property \(\text{JOINED}(id, cnt, cert) \Rightarrow \text{CERTIFIED}(id)\), there are a few more properties that are related to the authenticity of the join protocol. First,

\[
\text{CERTIFIED}(id, \exp(z, h(\text{pair}(\text{daaseed}(id_2), cnt)))) \\
\quad \quad \Rightarrow \text{STARTJOIN}(id, \exp(z, h(\text{pair}(\text{daaseed}(id), cnt)))) \land id = id_2 \\
\quad \quad \lor \text{LEAKTPM}(id) \land \text{LEAKTPM}(id_2).
\]

Here the event \(\text{STARTJOIN}(id, f)\) is defined to be raised as soon as an honest TPM tries to join with id \(id\) and f-value \(f\) (i.e., this event is raised at the beginning of tpmjoin). Intuitively this property means, if some process joins using an f-value that belongs to \(id_2\) but the issuer believes that \(id\) joined, then (i) the join was

\(^1\)At least not directly. An honestly generated f-value depends on the id, however, this is not verified in the ZK proof.

\(^2\)They defined security via an ideal functionality. In this ideal functionality, the issuer is notified when a party joins, and a party can check whether it joined successfully (e.g., by DAA-signing a message).

\(^3\)Note that the statement \(F_{join}\) is not changed, we do not prove anything about the id. However, similar to the message \(m\) in the signing operation, the attacker cannot replace the id by some other id without producing a new proof from scratch.
performed by an honest TPM \(id\) and \(id_2 = id\), or (ii) the adversary has corrupted both TPMs \(id\) and \(id_2\) (i.e., accessed their internal secrets). Further, we want that it is only possible that a message is successfully signed using an \(f\)-value belonging to an \(id\) if the TPM with that \(id\) has either been certified or corrupted.

\[
\text{DAAUTHVERIFIED}(m, \exp(z, h(\text{pair}(\text{daaseed}(id), \text{cnt})))) \Rightarrow \text{CERTIFIED}(id, N) \land \text{LEAKTPM}(id).
\]

\[
\text{DAAUTHVERIFIEDP}(m, bsn, \exp(z, h(\text{pair}(\text{daaseed}(id), \text{cnt})))) \Rightarrow \text{CERTIFIED}(id, N) \land \text{LEAKTPM}(id).
\]

Note that we cannot guarantee that if the TPM \(id\) is corrupted then it uses an \(f\)-value that belongs to it. It can use an \(f\)-value that belongs to another corrupted TPM. So the above property only guarantees that a corrupted TPM cannot “steal” the \(f\)-value of another uncorrupted TPM. (As done in the attack described above.)

All these properties are proven by ProVerif not to hold in the original DAA protocol but to hold in our modified protocol.

### 5.4.3 Anonymity

The second property we would like to examine is the anonymity of the anonymous DAA-sign operation. In other words, if two TPMs \(T_1, T_2\) might have signed a given message, the attacker should not be able to distinguish which TPM has signed the message. Obviously, this can be formalized as observational equivalence between two processes \(P_1, P_2\), where in \(P_i\) the TPM \(T_i\) signed the concerned message. E.g., a natural formulation would be to define \(P_1\) and \(P_2\) as follows:

\[
P_i := \text{leak} | \\
(\text{let } (id, cnt, och) = (id_1, n_1, int_1) \text{ in } \text{tpmjoin}) | \\
(\text{let } (id, cnt, och) = (id_2, n_1, int_1) \text{ in } \text{tpmjoin}) | \\
\text{int}_1(\text{cert}_1).\text{int}_2(\text{cert}_2). \\
\text{let } (id, cnt, cert) = (id_1, n_1, cert_i) \text{ in } \text{daasigna})
\]

with \(\text{leak} := (\text{pub}(id), \text{pub}(\text{pk}(\text{ek}(id)))) | \text{pub}(\text{pk}(\text{issuerK})) | \text{pub}(\text{sk}(\text{issuerK}))\), where \(id_1, id_2, n_1\) are free names and \(int_1, int_2\) are private channels for transmitting the certificate from the tpmjoin process to the daasigna process. The leak process leaks all public information and all secrets of the issuer. This models the case that the issuer is corrupted, thus making the security property stronger since anonymity holds even when the issuer colludes with the attacker. The two invocations of tpmjoin request certificates for different ids \(id_1\) and \(id_2\). These certificates are then assigned to the variables \(\text{cert}_1\) and \(\text{cert}_2\). Then a message \(m\) (\(m\) is a free name in daasigna) is signed with respect to either \(id_1\) and \(\text{cert}_1\) or \(id_2\) and \(\text{cert}_2\), depending on whether we consider the process \(P_1\) or \(P_2\). Anonymity is then defined as the statement that \(P_1\) and \(P_2\) are observationally equivalent.

Although we can successfully prove this fact using our compiler and ProVerif, a closer inspection reveals that this property is not very general. For example, it does not cover the case that the TPM \(T_1\) first signs a few messages, and then either \(T_1\) or \(T_2\) sends another message (so that the adversary can try to link messages). Further it does not take into account that the adversary might influence (i.e., choose) the messages to be signed, or that the \(T_i\) signs several messages, or that additionally pseudonymous signatures are produced. To capture all these cases, we need a much more complex security definition which is captured by the following game:

1. The issuer and an arbitrary number of TPMs are corrupted (i.e., their secrets leak).
2. Two non-corrupted challenge TPM ids \(id_1, id_2\) are chosen. Two cnt-value \(cnt_1, cnt_2\) are chosen.
3. The TPMs \(id_1, id_2\) join with respect to cnt-value \(cnt_1, cnt_2\), respectively.
4. The adversary may ask both challenge TPMs to execute the join protocol and to sign messages chosen by the adversary anonymously or pseudonymously with respect to either the certificates obtained in Step 3 or the certificates obtained in this step. This may happen arbitrarily often.
We model this by the processes we must require that the signatures produced in lines (9,10) to use a different basenames than those in line (6).

whether both signatures carry the same pseudonym

id
daanid

would be to take the process described in Table 8, but replace

(1) is used to generate an infinite supply of ids of corrupted T PMs. Finally, we additionally give the observer

doaasigna

to the certificate

i
cert

id

daanid

P

The property of anonymity is then formalized as the statement that

i
cert

id

daanid

The property of anonymity is then formalized as the statement that

i
cert

id

daanid

let id = id \_1 in TPMs | (let id = id \_2 in TPMs) |

int \_1(cert \_1).int \_2(cert \_2).

| ![1] P \_i := leak | (pub(x). let id = corrupt(x) in tpub(daaseed(id)).tpub(sk(ek(id)))) | (1) 
| ![2] (let \(id, cnt, och\) = (id \_1, cnt \_1, int \_1) in tpmjoin) | (2) 
| ![3] (let \(id, cnt, och\) = (id \_2, cnt \_2, int \_2) in tpmjoin) | (3) 
| ![4] (let id = id \_1 in TPMs) | (let id = id \_2 in TPMs) |  
| ![5] (int \_1(cert \_1).int \_2(cert \_2).) | (5) 
| ![6] (!pub(m). let \(id, cnt, cert, pub\) = (id \_i, cnt \_i, cert \_i, pubT) in daasigna) | (6) 
| ![7] (!pub(m). let \(id, cnt, cert\) = (id \_1, cnt \_1, cert \_1) in daasigna) | (7) 
| ![8] (!pub(m). let \(id, cnt, cert\) = (id \_2, cnt \_2, cert \_2) in daasigna) | (8) 
| ![9] (!pub(m). pub(bsn\_V). let \(id, cnt, cert\) = (id \_1, cnt \_1, cert \_1) in daasignp) | (9) 
| ![10] (!pub(m). pub(bsn\_V). let \(id, cnt, cert\) = (id \_2, cnt \_2, cert \_2) in daasignp) | (10) |

5. The adversary may ask the challenge TPM \(id_i\) to sign a message chosen by the adversary with respect to the certificate \(cert_i\). Here \(i \in \{1, 2\}\) depending on whether we are running the process \(P_1\) or \(P_2\) (and the adversary has to distinguish whether \(i = 1\) or \(i = 2\)). This may happen arbitrarily often.

We model this by the processes \(P_1, P_2\) given in Table 8. These processes constitute a formalization of the game depicted above. Note that although the adversary’s possibilities in lines 7–10 seem to be subsumed by the invocations of the subprocess TPMs in line 4, there is a slight difference: The process TPMs does not allow the attacker to sign messages with the certificates obtained in Step 5. The constructor corrupt in \(1\) is used to generate an infinite supply of ids of corrupted TPMs. Finally, we additionally give the observer the capability to distinguish the messages sent by the challenge TPM from the messages sent by the other processes: this is technically achieved by letting the challenge TPM use a different public channel \(pubT\).

The property of anonymity is then formalized as the statement that \(P_1\) and \(P_2\) are observationally equivalent, which is a statement accessible to ProVerif. When directly applying ProVerif to the output of the compiler described in Section 4.1 however, ProVerif does not terminate. Instead, we additionally have to rewrite the resulting theory using the technique given by Theorem 4 and Lemma 8. After this additional step, ProVerif successfully verifies that \(P_1\) and \(P_2\) are observationally equivalent. The running time is 117 seconds on a Pentium 4, 3 GHz. More details can be found in Section 6.2.3. Note that in the case of anonymity, we do not need to consider the case of rogue-listing, since neither the issuer nor the verifier appear in corrupted form.

5.4.4 Pseudonymity

Modeling the pseudonymity requirements is similar to anonymity; however, there are a few additional subtleties to be considered. A naive approach of modeling the security of the pseudonymous signatures would be to take the process described in Table 8 but replace daasigna by daasignp in line 6 and let the adversary choose the value of \(bsn_V\) in that line. This denotes the fact that the adversary can now ask the challenge TPM \(id_i\) to perform a pseudonymous signature. The resulting security property, however, cannot be expected to hold since the adversary could request a pseudonymous DAA-signature from the challenge TPM \(id_i\) via line 6 and a pseudonymous from the TPM \(id_1\) via line 9. Then the adversary could compare whether both signatures carry the same pseudonym \(N\), if so we have \(i = 1\), otherwise we have \(i = 2\). Instead, we must require that the signatures produced in lines 9,10 to use a different basenames than those in line 6.
We do this using two different sets of basenames. The basenames allowed for requesting a signature from
the challenge TPM \( id_i \) are of the form \( \text{bsnVch}(x) \) and those allowed for all other DAA-sign requests are
of the form \( \text{bsnVoth}(x) \) where \( \text{bsnVch} \) and \( \text{bsnVoth} \) are constructors of arity 1. The resulting processes \( P_1, P_2 \)
are depicted in Table 9. Note that we allow the adversary to request both anonymous and pseudonymous
DAA-signatures from the challenge TPM \( id_i \).

Using our compiler and ProVerif, we can show that \( P_1 \) and \( P_2 \) are observationally equivalent\(^4\). The verification of this fact takes 44 seconds on a Pentium 4, 3 GHz.

Our modelling in Table 9 implicitly assumes that it is guaranteed that the basename \( \text{bsn}_I \) of the issuer
does not equal any of the basenames of the verifiers. (The basename \( \text{bsn}_I \) of the issuer is modelled as a free
name.) It is known that if the basename of the issuer may coincide with one of the verifiers’ basenames there is
an attack on the pseudonymity of the system [28]: If \( \text{bsn}_I = \text{bsn}_V \), the values \( \zeta \) computed by the tpmjoin
and the daasignp processes are equal. If further both processes use the same f-value \( f \), the resulting pseudonym
\( N = \exp(\zeta, f) \) will also be equal. This allows to link signatures and joins. To model this, we model \( \text{bsn}_I \) as
a term of the form \( \text{bsnVch}(x) \). More exactly, we set

\[
P_1 := \text{leak} \mid (\text{pub}(x). \text{let id} = \text{corrupt}(x) \text{ in pub}(\text{daaseed}(id)).\text{pub}(\text{sk}(\text{ek}(id)))) \mid
\]

\[
(\text{let (id, cnt, och)} = (id_1, cnt_1, int_1) \text{ in tpmjoin}) \mid
\]

\[
(\text{let (id, cnt, och)} = (id_2, cnt_2, int_2) \text{ in tpmjoin}) \mid
\]

\[
(\text{let id} = id_1 \text{ in } \text{TPMs}) \mid (\text{let id} = id_2 \text{ in } \text{TPMs}) \mid
\]

\[
\text{int}_1(\text{cert}_1).\text{int}_2(\text{cert}_2).
\]

\[
(\text{let id} = id_1 \text{ in } \text{TPMs}) \mid (\text{let id} = id_2 \text{ in } \text{TPMs}) \mid
\]

\[
(\text{let (id, cnt, cert)} = (id, cnt, cert) \text{ in daasigna}) \mid
\]

\[
(\text{let (id, cnt, cert)} = (id, cnt, cert) \text{ in daasignp}) \mid
\]

\[
(\text{let (id, cnt, cert)} = (id, cnt, cert) \text{ in daasigna}) \mid
\]

\[
(\text{let (id, cnt, cert)} = (id, cnt, cert) \text{ in daasigna}) \mid
\]

\[
(\text{let id} = \text{pub}(x). \text{let (id, cnt, cert, bsn}_V) =
\]

\[
(id_1, cnt_1, cert_1, \text{bsnVch}(x)) \text{ in daasignp}) \mid
\]

\[
(\text{let id} = \text{pub}(x). \text{let (id, cnt, cert, bsn}_V) =
\]

\[
(id_2, cnt_2, cert_2, \text{bsnVoth}(x)) \text{ in daasignp}) \mid
\]

\[
\text{TPMs} := !\text{pub}(cnt).\text{voch.(tpmjoin)(och(cert)).!pub(m).}
\]

\[
(\text{daasignp}|\text{pub}(x).\text{let bsn}_V = \text{bsnVoth}(x) \text{ in daasignp})).
\]

We do this using two different sets of basenames. The basenames allowed for requesting a signature from
the challenge TPM \( id_i \) are of the form \( \text{bsnVch}(x) \) and those allowed for all other DAA-sign requests are
of the form \( \text{bsnVoth}(x) \) where \( \text{bsnVch} \) and \( \text{bsnVoth} \) are constructors of arity 1. The resulting processes \( P_1, P_2 \)
are depicted in Table 9. Note that we allow the adversary to request both anonymous and pseudonymous
DAA-signatures from the challenge TPM \( id_i \).

Using our compiler and ProVerif, we can show that \( P_1 \) and \( P_2 \) are observationally equivalent\(^4\). The verification of this fact takes 44 seconds on a Pentium 4, 3 GHz.

Our modelling in Table 9 implicitly assumes that it is guaranteed that the basename \( \text{bsn}_I \) of the issuer
does not equal any of the basenames of the verifiers. (The basename \( \text{bsn}_I \) of the issuer is modelled as a free
name.) It is known that if the basename of the issuer may coincide with one of the verifiers’ basenames there is
an attack on the pseudonymity of the system [28]: If \( \text{bsn}_I = \text{bsn}_V \), the values \( \zeta \) computed by the tpmjoin
and the daasignp processes are equal. If further both processes use the same f-value \( f \), the resulting pseudonym
\( N = \exp(\zeta, f) \) will also be equal. This allows to link signatures and joins. To model this, we model \( \text{bsn}_I \) as
a term of the form \( \text{bsnVch}(x) \). More exactly, we set

\[
P_1 := \text{let bsn}_I := \text{bsnVch}(n_0) \text{ in } P_1
\]

and ask whether \( \tilde{P}_1 \) and \( \tilde{P}_2 \) are observationally equivalent. As expected, the combination of our compiler and
ProVerif successfully detects the attack and outputs that \( \tilde{P}_1 \) and \( \tilde{P}_2 \) are not observationally equivalent. The verification takes 26 seconds on a Pentium 4, 3 GHz.

---

\(^4\)As with the proof of anonymity, we have to apply Theorem[^4] and Lemma[^8] to ensure termination.
In [28] it is proposed to fix the protocol by using different integers in the computation of $\zeta$ in the processes $t_{pmjoin}$ and $d_{asignp}$. We do this by defining $n_V := n_0$ instead of $n_V := n_1$ in the definition of $d_{asignp}$. Using this change, our compiler together with ProVerif successfully determines that $\hat{P}_1$ and $\hat{P}_2$ are observationally equivalent. The verification takes 73 seconds on a Pentium 4, 3 GHz.

6 Mechanized Security Proofs for DAA

In this section, we will examine the practical applicability of the results of the previous sections to mechanized security proofs. Instead of designing a new tool from scratch, we implemented a compiler that generates input for the automated prover ProVerif [9] according to the description given in Section 4.1. This compiler together with example inputs can be found at [6]. To show how our theory is applied, we analyze two protocols, namely the simple example protocol from Section 3.3 and the DAA protocol [11]. We will describe how to prove different security properties of these protocols and also what pitfalls occurred in our investigation and how to avoid these.

6.1 Example Protocol

We first examine the example protocol from [5,3]. Many of the techniques described here will also be used in the more complex example of DAA below. We model the example protocol as follows (omitting the specification of the base theory here)\footnote{\[6\], file simple.pvi.}

```plaintext
free pub,A,B.
private free priv,s1,s2,s3.

define zkproof =
land(
  or(or(eq(alpha2,beta1),eq(alpha2,beta2)),eq(alpha2,beta3)),
sigver(alpha1,beta4,alpha2)).

let server = event GAVEAUTHFOR(s,A,B); out(priv,sign(pair(A,B),sk(s))).
let B = in(priv,sig); if sigver(sig,pair(A,B),pk(s))=true then
  out(pub,zk(sig,pk(s);pk(s1),pk(s2),pk(s3),pair(A,B);zkproof)).
let A = in(pub,zkp); if zkver(2;4;zkproof;zkp)=true then
  if public1(zkp)=pk(s1) then
    if public2(zkp)=pk(s2) then
      if public3(zkp)=pk(s3) then
        if fst(public4(zkp))=A then
          event GOTAUTHFOR(snd(public4(zkp)));
  let leakpublic = out(pub,pk(s1)) | out(pub,pk(s2)) | out(pub,pk(s3)).
```

The syntax of this protocol should be mostly self-explanatory. It is the syntax of ProVerif with a few additions particular to our tool. The `define` statement defines an abbreviation `zkproof` for the formula we use in all ZK proofs and verifications (we use `land` instead of and since and is a reserved keyword in proVerif). The process `server` produces a signature on `pair(A,B)` using the secret key `sk(s)` and sends it to `B` over a secret channel. All server processes $S_i$ are modelled using this single process `server` by instantiating $s$ with different identities.

The process `B` then waits for a message from a server, checks whether this message constitutes a valid signature of `pair(A,B)` and then sends a ZK proof to `A` that it knows a signature `sig` that is valid with
respect to one of the keys \( pk(s_1), pk(s_2), pk(s_3) \) (without revealing which one). Note the syntax of the ZK constructor: It takes arguments \( (\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_i; \beta_1, \ldots, \beta_j; F) \); the placement of the semicolons indicate which arguments are private \( (\alpha_\mu) \), which are public \( (\beta_\mu) \) and which is the formula to be proven \( (F) \).

The process \( A \) waits for the proof sent by \( B \) and assigns it to the variable \( zkp \). It first verifies whether \( zkp \) is actually a valid proof of the correct arity \( (2;4) \) for the right formula \( zkproof \). Further it verifies that the public keys given in the ZK proof are the right ones and that the message \( m \) of which \( B \) claims to know a signature is indeed a pair having \( A \) as its first component. If so, \( A \) claims to have received authorization to communicate with the process whose identity is given in the second component of \( m \).

Finally, we need to model a fourth process. This is due to the fact that we had to declare the server ids \( s_1, s_2, s_3 \) as private free names since otherwise the adversary would know the secret keys \( sk(s_1), sk(s_2), sk(s_3) \). Since the adversary should however know \( pk(s_1), pk(s_2), pk(s_3) \), we define a process \( leakpublic \) that outputs these values on a public channel.

So far these processes stand by themselves and are not executed in a common context. How these processes are actually executed depends on the property we want to prove.

We will now model the first security property. We require that \( A \) will not accept to communicate with \( B \) unless some server has signed an authorization. Or in the parlance of the events defined in the protocol description above, we want that if the event \( GOTAUTHFOR(sender) \) occurs, then the event \( GAVEAUTHFOR(server, recipient, sender) \) occurred earlier with the same value of \( sender \). This is modelled by the following code fragment:\footnote{If we compile the code \( \text{simple-auth.pvz} \).}

```
compiler ZK.
```

process

```
leakpublic |
(let s=s1 in server) |
(let s=s2 in server) |
(let s=s3 in server) |
(let s=s1 in B) |
A
```

Here we see how we instantiate the value \( s \) to different server ids, so that we can use the single definition of \( server \) for all occurrences of the server: We run several instances of \( server \), and in each of them we substitute \( s \) with a different server id using the \( let \) statement. Similarly, we instantiate the process \( B \) so that it expects a message from server \( s_1 \). The first line of the code fragment indicates which property we would like to prove. The keyword \( passthrough \) simply indicates that this command should be passed through directly to ProVerif and not be parsed by our compiler.

Finally, we have to tell our compiler what to do with our code. This is done by the statement \( \text{compiler ZK} \) which instructs our tool to implement the compiler as described in \footnote{Section 4.1}.

If we compile and execute this code (see the README file in \footnote{If we compile the code \( \text{simple-auth.pvz} \).}) ProVerif successfully determines that the required property is indeed fulfilled (the running time is less than one second on a Pentium 4, 3 GHz). This property intuitively depends both on the soundness of the ZK proof (i.e., we cannot prove a wrong statement) and on the unforgeability of the signatures.

We will now investigate a more complex property: We require that given the public communication between \( A \) and \( B \), we cannot determine which server authorized the communication. In other words, we want
observational equivalence between a process where server $s_1$ authorizes $B$ and a process where server $s_2$ authorizes $B$. This can be modelled as follows:

$$\text{process } leakpublic |$$
$$\phantom{\text{process }} (\text{let } s=\text{choice}[s_1,s_2] \text{ in server}) |$$
$$\phantom{\text{process }} (\text{let } s=\text{choice}[s_1,s_2] \text{ in } B) |$$
$$\phantom{\text{process }} A$$

In the language of ProVerif, the choice operator is used to check for observational equivalence. The code given here specifies two processes $P_1, P_2$, where $P_1$ results from replacing every occurrence of choice$t_1, t_2$ by $t_1$, and ProVerif tries to prove that $P_1$ and $P_2$ are observationally equivalent. In the present case, ProVerif tries to prove observational equivalence between processes $P_1$ and $P_2$ where $P_1$ is an execution of our example protocol where $B$ gets its authorization from server $s_1$, and $P_2$ is an execution where $B$ gets its authorization from server $s_2$. Unfortunately, however, on the input described above, ProVerif does not seem to terminate. Experiments show that we need to get rid of the constructors land and or to allow for termination. Unfortunately, we cannot just remove them from our equational theory, since our protocol actually uses them (in zkproof). Even after applying our compiler, which removes all occurrences of the formula $F := \text{zkproof}$ from the process itself, land and or are still contained in the equational theory generated by the compiler since this theory contains the following rule:

$$\text{ZK}_{2,4}^F(x_1,x_2,y_1,y_2,y_3,y_4) = \text{PZK}_{2,4}^F(x_1,x_2,y_1,y_2,y_3,y_4),$$
$$\text{land} (\text{or} (\text{eq}(x_2,y_1), \text{eq}(x_2,y_2)), \text{eq}(x_2,y_3)), \text{sigver}(x_1,y_4,x_2)).$$

(22)

**Theorem 4** allows us to remove this rule. It is easy to see that in our equational theory **Theorem 4** applies with $n_{2,4,F} = 3$ and

$$\tilde{\tau}_{2,4,F}^1 = (\text{sign}(x,sk(y)),pk(y),pk(y),p_2,p_3,x),$$
$$\tilde{\tau}_{2,4,F}^2 = (\text{sign}(x,sk(y)),pk(y),p_1,pk(y),p_3,x),$$
$$\tilde{\tau}_{2,4,F}^3 = (\text{sign}(x,sk(y)),pk(y),p_1,p_2,pk(y),x).$$

Application of **Lemma 8** then removes the rule (22). Instead, the rules

$$\text{Ver}_{2,4}^F(\text{ZK}_{2,4}^F(\text{sign}(x,sk(y)),pk(y),pk(y),p_2,p_3,x)) = \text{true},$$
$$\text{Ver}_{2,4}^F(\text{ZK}_{2,4}^F(\text{sign}(x,sk(y)),pk(y),p_1,pk(y),p_3,x)) = \text{true},$$
$$\text{Ver}_{2,4}^F(\text{ZK}_{2,4}^F(\text{sign}(x,sk(y)),pk(y),p_1,p_2,pk(y),x)) = \text{true}$$

are introduced (besides the obvious rules concerning the public constructor). Since now neither the process nor the equational theory contains land or or, by **Lemma 8** we can remove the corresponding equational rules.

These additional transformations can also be performed using our tool. For this, we have to add the following additional commands to the input file:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>compiler AlternativeZKVer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>zkver(2;4;zkproof;zk(sign(x,sk(y)),pk(y),pk(y),p2,p3,x;zkproof)),</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zkver(2;4;zkproof;zk(sign(x,sk(y)),pk(y),p1,pk(y),p3,x;zkproof)),</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zkver(2;4;zkproof;zk(sign(x,sk(y)),pk(y),p1,p2,pk(y),x;zkproof))).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

[6]. file simple-obseq-nonterm.pvz.

[7]. file simple-obseq.pvz.
compiler RemoveEquations(or).
compiler RemoveEquations(land).

(after the compiler ZK command). The first command corresponds to an application of Theorem 4. The tuples \( t_1, \ldots, t_n \) are implicitly given by supplying terms of the form \( \text{Ver}_{i,j}(F, ZK_{i,j}(t_i, F)) \). Finally, compiler RemoveEquations \((c)\) for a constructor \( c \) removes all equations of the form \( c(...) = \ldots \).

Using the resulting modified but equivalent (see Theorem 4 and Lemma 8) equational theory, ProVerif terminates and successfully proves observational equivalence, i.e., the adversary cannot distinguish which server authorizes \( B \) to communicate with \( A \). The verification takes 16 seconds on a Pentium 4, 3 GHz.

6.2 Direct Anonymous Attestation

We will now describe the mechanized analysis of the DAA protocol [11] described in Section 5.

6.2.1 Join

First, we describe the basic definition of the various components of the DAA protocol (join and DAA-sign). The join protocol is described by the following two processes tpmjoin and issuer.

\[
\text{define } \text{joinproof} = \text{land}(\text{eq}(\text{beta1}, \text{blind}(\text{alpha1}, \text{alpha2})), \text{eq}(\text{beta2}, \text{exp}(\text{beta3}, \text{alpha1}))).
\]

\[
\text{let tpmjoin} =
\begin{align*}
&\text{let } f = \text{hash}(\text{pair}(\text{daaseed}(\text{id}), \text{cnt})) \text{ in} \\
&\quad \text{new } v; \\
&\quad \text{let } U = \text{blind}(f, v) \text{ in} \\
&\quad \text{let } \text{zetaI} = \text{hash}(\text{pair}(n1, \text{bsnI})) \text{ in} \\
&\quad \text{let } \text{NI} = \text{exp}(\text{zetaI}, f) \text{ in} \\
&\quad \text{let } \text{zk} = \text{zk}(f, v; U, \text{NI}, \text{zetaI}; \text{joinproof}) \text{ in} \\
&\quad \text{event STARTJOIN}(\text{id}, \text{NI}); \\
&\quad \text{out}((\text{comm}, \text{pair}(\text{id}, \text{zk}))); \\
&\quad \text{in}((\text{comm2}, \text{encnonce}); \\
&\quad \text{let } \text{nonce} = \text{dec}(\text{encnonce}, \text{sk}(\text{ek}(\text{id}))) \text{ in} \\
&\quad \text{out}((\text{comm}, \text{hash}((U, \text{nonce}))); \\
&\quad \text{in}(\text{comm}, A); \\
&\quad \text{let } \text{cert} = \text{unblind}(A, v) \text{ in} \\
&\quad \text{if } \text{blindver}(\text{cert}, f, \text{pk}(\text{issuerK})) = \text{true} \text{ then} \\
&\quad \text{event JOINED}(\text{id}, \text{cnt}, \text{cert}); \\
&\quad \text{out}(\text{och}, \text{cert}).
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\text{let issuer} =
\begin{align*}
&\text{!, in}(\text{comm}, \text{msg}); \\
&\text{let } \text{zk} = \text{snd}(\text{msg}) \text{ in} \\
&\text{if } \text{zkver}(2; 3; \text{joinproof}; \text{zk}) = \text{true} \text{ then} \\
&\quad \text{let } \text{id} = \text{fst}(\text{msg}) \text{ in} \\
&\quad \text{let } U = \text{public1}(\text{zk}) \text{ in} \\
&\quad \text{new nonce;}
\end{align*}
\]

\[\text{file daa.pvi.}\]
out(comm2, enc(nonce, pk(ek(id))));
in(comm, hashednonce);
if hashednonce = hash((U, nonce)) then
  let N = public2(zkp) in
  let zeta = public3(zkp) in
  if rogue = true then event ROGUEI(id) else
  if rogueid = true then event ROGUEID(id) else
  if zeta = hash(pair(n1, bsnI)) then
    let cert = blindsign(U, sk(issuerK)) in
    event CERTIFIED(id, N);
  out(comm, cert).

These processes are ProVerif implementations of the corresponding processes in Section 5.1. We added the additional events STARTJOIN, JOINED and CERTIFIED to have the possibility of formulating additional properties. In contrast to Section 5.1, the communication channel is represented by the variable comm, which we then instantiate with the public channel pub or a private channel, depending on the property we model. The predicates rogue and rogueid can be defined using define rogue = ... and define rogueid = ... depending on the situation. In most cases we will set rogue = rogueid = false to model that no rogue checking occurs. The term joinproof corresponds to $F_{\text{join}}$ in Section 5.1. We also implemented a variant of the DAA protocol where we use signatures instead of encrypted nonces for authentication. This variant enjoys greater simplicity and may be preferred for first experiments.\footnote{This variant can be enabled by setting \#unsetflag nonceauthentication in [6], file daa-config.pvi.}

For the analysis of protocols with rogue TPMs we will need an additional process. The process issuer will never issue a certificate to a TPM that is detected to be rogue, but we might want to model the case that some TPMs have already received a certificate before they were marked rogue. In order to be able to model this situation, we introduce the following process rogueissuer that issues a certificate for a given f-value:\footnote{[6], file daa.pvi.}

\[
\text{let rogueissuer } = \\
!\text{in}(\text{pub}, v); \text{out}(\text{pub}, \text{unblind} (\text{blindsign} (\text{blind}(f, v), \text{sk}(\text{issuerK})), v)).
\]

The variable f will be assigned the correct value in our security properties using a let directive. The nonce v used for blinding the signature is chosen by the adversary to model that a rogue TPM is assumed to be completely under the control of the adversary.

Finally, we also need to model the fact that the issuer is corrupted. This is achieved by giving all the issuer’s knowledge to the adversary:\footnote{[6], file daa.pvi.}

\[
\text{let leakissuer } = \\
(\text{!in}(\text{pub}, \text{id}); \text{out}(\text{pub}, \text{pk} (\text{ek} (\text{id})))); |
\text{out}(\text{pub}, \text{pk} (\text{issuerK})) | \text{out}(\text{pub}, \text{sk} (\text{issuerK})).
\]

Similarly, we model that a given TPM is corrupted:\footnote{[6], file daa.pvi.}

\[
\text{let leaktpm } = \\
\text{out}(\text{pub}, \text{daaseed} (\text{id})); | \text{out}(\text{pub}, \text{sk} (\text{ek} (\text{id}))); | \text{out}(\text{pub}, \text{pk} (\text{ek} (\text{id}))).
\]

Finally, besides leaking private information of corrupted principals, the adversary should get all public information:

\[
\text{let leakpublic } = \text{out}(\text{pub}, \text{pk} (\text{issuerK})); | \text{!in}(\text{pub}, \text{id}); \text{out}(\text{pub}, \text{pk} (\text{ek} (\text{id}))).
\]
6.2.2 DAA-Sign

We will now describe the modelling of the second part of the DAA protocol, namely the DAA-sign protocol. The processes for performing an anonymous DAA-sign are defined as follows:

\[
\text{define signproof} = \land(\text{eq}(\beta_1, \exp(\beta_2, \alpha_1)), \\
\text{blindver}(\alpha_2, \alpha_1, \beta_3)).
\]

\[
\text{let daasigna} = \\
\text{new zeta;} \\
\text{let } f = \text{hash(pair(daaseed(id), cnt)) in} \\
\text{let } N = \exp(zeta, f) \text{ in} \\
\text{let } zkproof = zk(f, cert; N, zeta, pk(issuerK), m; signproof) \text{ in} \\
\text{event DAASIGNEDA(id, cnt, m);} \\
\text{out(comm, zkproof).}
\]

\[
\text{let daaverp} = \\
\text{in(comm, zkproof);} \\
\text{if zkver(2;4;signproof;zkproof)=true then} \\
\text{let } N = \text{public1(zkproof) in} \\
\text{let } zeta = \text{public2(zkproof) in} \\
\text{if public3(zkproof)=pk(issuerK) then} \\
\text{let } m = \text{public4(zkproof) in} \\
\text{if rogue=true then event ROGUEAV(m) else} \\
\text{event DAAVERIFIEDA(m).}
\]

These are again direct encodings of the corresponding processes presented in Section 5.2, except that we have added a few more events and use \text{comm} for communication. The term \text{signproof} corresponds to \( F_{\text{sign}} \) in Section 5.2.

Similarly, we define the pseudonymous DAA-sign protocol:

\[
\text{define numberZetaV = n1.}
\]

\[
\text{let daasignp} = \\
\text{let zeta = hash(pair(numberZetaV, bsnV)) in} \\
\text{let } f = \text{hash(pair(daaseed(id), cnt)) in} \\
\text{let } N = \exp(zeta, f) \text{ in} \\
\text{let } zkproof = zk(f, cert; N, zeta, pk(issuerK), m; signproof) \text{ in} \\
\text{event DAASIGNEDP(id, cnt, bsnV, m);} \\
\text{out(comm, zkproof).}
\]

\[
\text{let daaverp} = \\
\text{in(comm, zkproof);} \\
\text{if zkver(2;4;signproof;zkproof)=true then} \\
\text{let } N = \text{public1(zkproof) in} \\
\text{let } zeta = \text{public2(zkproof) in} \\
\text{if zeta=hash(pair(numberZetaV, bsnV)) then} \\
\text{if public3(zkproof)=pk(issuerK) then}
\]

\footnote{14 file daa.pvi.}
let m = public4(zkproof) in
  if rogue=true then event ROGUEPV(m,bsnV,N) else
  event DAAVERIFIEDP(m,bsnV,N).

This formalizes the corresponding processes from Section 5.2 with the addition of events and the change of
the communication channel.

For convenience, we further implement the following processes:

let daaverifier = (! daavera) | (! daaverp).

This process represents a verification server that waits for anonymous and pseudonymous signatures, checks
them, and outputs the corresponding events.

let tpmcontrolled =
  let comm=pub in ! in(pub,cnt); new och; (tpmjoin | (in(och,cert);
  ! in(pub,m); (daasigna | in(pub,bsnV); daasignp))).

let tpmcontrolledall = ! in(pub,id); tpmcontrolled.

The process tpmcontrolled corresponds to the process TPMs introduced on page 26 and models a TPM
that is under the control of the adversary without revealing any of its secrets, i.e., the TPM joins and signs at
the adversary's discretion. The process tpmcontrolledall represents the fact that all TPMs are under
the control of the adversary.

6.2.3 Security Properties

Authenticity. The authenticity property from Section 5.4.1 is encoded as follows:

\[
\text{passthrough query ev:DAAVERIFIEDP(xm, xbsn, xN)} \Rightarrow \text{ev:DAASIGNEDP(xid, xcnt, xbsn, xm)}.
\]

\[
\text{passthrough query ev:DAAVERIFIEDA(xm)} \Rightarrow (\text{ev:DAASIGNEDA(xid, xcnt, xm)} | \text{ev:DAASIGNEDP(xid, xcnt, xbsn, xm)}).
\]

process
  (let comm=pub in issuer) | leakpublic |
  tpmcontrolledall |
  (let comm=pub in daaverifier).

The passthrough directive is only necessary since our compiler is not able to parse the full syntax of
query. It does not have any semantic meaning. Applying the compiler and ProVerif, the result is that the
queried properties hold. The running time is 3 seconds on a Pentium 4, 3 GHz.

To implement this security property in the presence of rogue TPMs, we have to choose some rogue
f-value and rogue TPM ids and define the predicates rogue and rogueid to returns true if a
rogue f-value or id is being used. We choose to implement a test with a fixed number of rogue ids
rogueid1, rogueid2, rogueid3 and three fixed f-values rogueF1, rogueF2, rogueF3. These are
defined using the following code:

\[
\text{free rogueid1, rogueid2, rogueid3.}
\]

\[\text{[6], file daa-verify-tpmcontrolled.pvz.}\]
\[\text{[6], file daa-verify-tpmcontrolled-rogue3.pvz.}\]
define rogueF1 = hash(pair(daaseed(rogueid1),n1)).
define rogueF2 = hash(pair(daaseed(rogueid2),n1)).
define rogueF3 = hash(pair(daaseed(rogueid2),n2)).

fun roguetest/5.
equation roguetest(zeta,exp(zeta,x),x,y,z) = true.
equation roguetest(zeta,exp(zeta,y),x,y,z) = true.
equation roguetest(zeta,exp(zeta,z),x,y,z) = true.
define rogue = roguetest(zeta,N,rogueF1,rogueF2,rogueF3).
define rogueid = or(or(eq(id,rogueid1),eq(id,rogueid2)),eq(id,rogueid3)).

Note that we did not use the somewhat more natural definition

\[
\text{define rogue} = \text{or(} \text{or(eq(exp(zeta,rogueF1)), eq(exp(zeta,rogueF2))), eq(exp(zeta,rogueF3)))}. 
\]

but instead used a definition using a special constructor roguetest. Using the more natural definition ProVerif fails to prove security; it seems that the rogue test is simply ignored. A minimal ProVerif example that reproduces this behaviour is given in [6, file artifacts/or.pv].

Furthermore, we have to model the fact that the rogue TPMs may already have joined before they were rogue-listed, and that the adversary may know the secret information of the rogue TPMs. This is done by adding the following processes (additionally to those given in the authenticity property without rogue listing): \[17\]

\[
\text{(let id=rogueid1 in leaktpm) |}
\text{(let id=rogueid2 in leaktpm) |}
\text{(let id=rogueid3 in leaktpm) |}
\text{(let f=rogueF1 in rogueissuer) |}
\text{(let f=rogueF2 in rogueissuer) |}
\text{(let f=rogueF3 in rogueissuer)}
\]

The authenticity property in this setting is proven in 5 seconds on a Pentium 4, 3 GHz.

**Authenticity of the Join Protocol.** The authenticity property of the join protocol (Section 5.4.2) is given by the following code: \[18\]

\[
\text{passthrough query } \text{ev:JOINED}(x,y,z) \rightarrow \text{ev:CERTIFIED}(x,w). \\
\text{passthrough query } \text{ev:CERTIFIED}(id,exp(z,hash(pair(daaseed(id),cnt)))) \\
\rightarrow (\text{ev:STARTJOIN}(id, exp(z, hash(pair(daaseed(id),cnt))) \& id=id2) \\
\quad | \text{ev:LEAKTPM(id) \& ev:LEAKTPM(id2)}). \\
\text{passthrough query } \text{ev:DAAVERIFIEDA}(m,exp(z,hash(pair(daaseed(id),cnt)))) \\
\rightarrow (\text{ev:CERTIFIED(id,N) \& ev:LEAKTPM(id)}). \\
\text{passthrough query } \text{ev:DAAVERIFIEDP}(m,bsn,exp(z,hash(pair(daaseed(id),cnt)))) \\
\rightarrow (\text{ev:CERTIFIED(id,N) \& ev:LEAKTPM(id)}). \\
\]

\[
\text{let leaktpm} = \\
\text{event LEAKTPM(id);} \\
\text{out(pub,daaseed(id)) |}
\]

\[17\] [6], file daa-verify-tpmcontrolled-rogue3.pvz.
\[18\] [6], file daa-join-auth.pvz.
With the original modelling of DAA (as presented above), all queries fail. To solve this problem, we change the DAA protocol as follows. In the definition of \texttt{tpmjoin}, we replace
\begin{verbatim}
let zkp = zk(f,v;U,NI,zetaI;joinproof) in
\end{verbatim}
by
\begin{verbatim}
let zkp = zk(f,v;U,NI,zetaI,id;joinproof) in
\end{verbatim}
and in the definition of \texttt{issuer}, we replace
\begin{verbatim}
if zkver(2;3;joinproof;zkp)=true then
let id = fst(msg) in
\end{verbatim}
by
\begin{verbatim}
if zkver(2;4;joinproof;zkp)=true then
let id = public4(zkp) in
\end{verbatim}
Then the above queries succeed. To activate this modified version of DAA, change \texttt{#unsetflag idinproof} to \texttt{#setflag idinproof} in file \texttt{daa-config.pvi}. Note that this change affects all source files contributed in \cite{6}.

Anonymity. The anonymity property from Section 5.4.3 is given by the following code (cf. Table 8)\cite{19}
\begin{verbatim}
free challengeid1,challengeid2.
free challengecnt1,challengecnt2.
define challengecnt = choice[challengecnt1,challengecnt2].
define challengeid = choice[challengeid1,challengeid2].
define challengecert = choice[challengecert1,challengecert2].
private free int1,int2.

fun corruptid/1.

process
  leakpublic |
  leakissuer |
\end{verbatim}
\cite{6}, file \texttt{daa-obseq-anonymity4.pvz}.
The two processes to compare are implicitly given by the choice operator. The semantics is that the process $P_1$ is the one resulting from replacing $\text{choice}[x, y]$ by $x$, and $P_2$ is the one resulting from replacing $\text{choice}[x, y]$ by $y$. Running our compiler and ProVerif one this process directly does not lead to termination. The technique for removing the land and or constructors that was already described in Section 6.1 helps to ensure termination. In the case of DAA we apply Theorem 4 with $n_{2,3,F_{\text{join}}} = n_{2,4,F_{\text{sign}}} = 1$ and

\[
\tilde{\tau}_{2,3,F_{\text{join}}} = (f, v; \text{blind}(f, v), \text{exp}(\zeta, f), \zeta; \text{joinproof}) \\
\tilde{\tau}_{2,4,F_{\text{sign}}} = (\text{unblind}(\text{blindsign}(\text{blind}(x, z), \text{sk}(y)), z); \text{exp}(\zeta, x), \zeta, \text{pk}(y), m)
\]

Then we can remove the equations for land and or (by Lemma 8). These modification of the equational theory are encoded as follows:

```plaintext
compiler AlternativeZKVer(zkver(2;3;joinproof; 
zk(f,v;blind(f,v),exp(zeta,f),zeta; joinproof))).

compiler AlternativeZKVer(zkver(2;4;signproof; 
zk(x,unblind(blindsign(blind(x,z),sk(y)),z);exp(zeta,x),zeta,pk(y),m; 
signproof))).

compiler RemoveEquations(land).
compiler RemoveEquations(or).
```

After these changes, the proof terminates and we get the result that the two processes are observationally equivalent, i.e., that we have anonymity, after 117 seconds on a Pentium 4, 3 GHz.

---

2010, file alternative-zk.pvi.
The remaining property is that of pseudonymity. Since the encoding of the processes given in Section 5.4.4 for modeling this property does not give any new insights, we refer the reader to the files daa-obseq-pseudonymity6.pvz (for the processes $P_1, P_2$ given in Table 9), daa-obseq-pseudonymity-attack.pvz (for the processes $\tilde{P}_1, \tilde{P}_2$ capturing the attack of [28]) and daa-obseq-pseudonymity-fix.pvz (modeling $\tilde{P}_1, \tilde{P}_2$ in the fixed version of the protocol with $n_V := n_0$) in [6].

7 Conclusion and Future Work

We have designed an abstraction of non-interactive zero-knowledge protocols in the applied-pi calculus. A novel equational theory for terms characterizes the semantic properties of non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs. Additionally, we propose an encoding into a finite specification in terms of a convergent rewriting system that is accessible to a fully mechanized analysis. The encoding is sound and fully automated. We successfully used the automated protocol verifier ProVerif to obtain the first mechanized analysis of the Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA) protocol. The analysis in particular required us to come up with suitable abstractions of sophisticated cryptographic security definitions that are based on interactive games; we consider these definitions of independent interest.

Future work on this topic comprises the investigation of computational soundness results for our equational theory, the analysis of other commonly employed protocols based on zero-knowledge, as well as the investigation of interactive zero-knowledge proofs which have additional properties like the impossibility to reproduce a proof after the protocols ends. Furthermore, other more direct techniques for mechanizing the analysis directly in the original, infinite equational theory might be worth investigating.

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References


